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ABSTRACT 
 This Article will examine the terms and conditions under 
which Internet Service Providers (“ISPs”) switch and route traffic 
for each of several links between a source of content and 
consumers. The Article concludes that the Federal 
Communications Commission (“FCC”) may lack direct statutory 
authority even to resolve disputes based on its determination that 
Internet access constitutes an unregulated information service.  
Additionally the FCC may appropriately forebear from regulating, 
because sufficient competition favors industry self-regulation.   
 Despite substantial reasons not to intervene, the FCC 
nevertheless might have to clarify its understanding of what 
subscribers of retail ISP services can expect to receive.  Under 
truth in billing and other consumer safeguards the Commission 
might require ISPs to explain what an Internet subscription 
guarantees not only in terms of transmission speed and 
downloading capacity, but also what subscribers can expect their 
ISPs to do when receiving content requiring downstream 
termination.    
The Article concludes that both customers of content 
services, such as Netflix, and retail ISP subscribers expect their 
service providers to guarantee delivery of movies and all sorts of 
Internet traffic respectively.  For physical delivery of DVDs Netflix 
must pay the U.S. Postal Service and for delivery of streaming bits 
Netflix must pay one or more ISPs.  But for Internet traffic 
involving two or more ISPs, the Article examines whether other 
retail ISPs providing last mile delivery of content violate their 
service commitments to subscribers by demanding additional 
payment from upstream carriers. 
  
                                                
* Pioneers Chair and Professor of Telecommunications and Law, Penn State 
University. Email: rmf5@psu.edu 
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 Internet Service Providers (ISPs) provide end users with 
access to and from the Internet cloud.1 In addition to providing the 
first and last mile carriage of traffic,2 ISPs secure upstream access 
to sources of content via lines leased from telecommunications 
service providers and also via other ISPs typically on a paid 
(transit), or barter (peering)3 basis. Because a single ISP typically 
operates in two separate segments of traffic routing, downstream to 
subscribers and upstream to other carriers, the terms and conditions 
of network interconnection and the degree of marketplace 
competition can vary greatly. In this two-sided market,4 ISPs 
                                                
1 The Internet cloud refers to the vast array of interconnected networks that 
make up the Internet and provide users with seamless connectivity to these 
networks and the content available via these networks. See William Jeremy 
Robison, Free at What Cost?: Cloud Computing Privacy Under The Stored 
Communications Act, 98 GEO. L.J. 1195, 1199 (2010) (“The increasing 
functionality of the Internet is decreasing the role of the personal computer. This 
shift is being led by the growth of ‘cloud computing’—the ability to run 
applications and store data on a service provider's computers over the Internet, 
rather than on a person's desktop computer.”). 
2 The first and last mile refers to the link, of any length, provided by a retail ISP 
to subscribers so they can download and receive content from the Internet cloud 
and also upload content and instructions. “Telephone and Internet traffic are 
often carried over the same physical wires and cables—they are simply encoded 
using different operational protocols. In the classical North American Internet 
access model of the 1990s, the humble copper loop PSTN line was the 
predominant type of ‘first mile’ physical layer link connecting the user with the 
Internet. Craig McTaggert, A Layered Approach to Internet Legal Analysis, 48 
MCGILL L.J. 571, 583 (2003). 
3  
Currently, agreements for the exchange of Internet traffic are 
unregulated and left solely to commercial negotiation between 
Internet backbone providers. Agreements for the exchange of 
traffic between operators are called “peering agreements” and 
depending on the balance of traffic, it may be either free or 
paid. Other arrangements provide that one network will carry 
traffic without exchanging traffic on that network link. This 
will involve payment, and such service is called “transit.” 
 
Daniel L. Brenner & Winston Maxwell, The Network Neutrality and the Netflix 
Dispute: Upcoming Challenges for Content Providers in Europe and the United 
States, 23 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 3, 5 (2011). 
 
4  
Informally, a two-sided market can be thought of as a meeting 
place that brings together two distinct user groups, each of 
which benefits from the presence of the other. Examples 
include auctions, credit cards, dating bars, newspapers, video 
game consoles, and the Yellow Pages. No car auction would 
be possible without the presence of buyers willing to purchase 
3
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typically have many transit and peering opportunities upstream to 
content providers, but downstream the ISP may face limited 
competition from other ventures providing so-called first- and last-
mile broadband Internet access. Regardless of the scope of retail 
Internet access competition, consumers usually select only one ISP 
to handle all traffic requirements.5 
 The variability of competitiveness in the market for 
upstream and downstream Internet access has motivated some 
stakeholders to claim that national regulatory authorities, such as 
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC),6 should 
intervene to remedy market failures and existing or potential 
anticompetitive practices. The so-called Network Neutrality7 
debate has focused largely on the potential for ISPs serving end 
users to favor affiliates in the delivery of content to subscribers, or 
                                                                                                         
and sellers willing to sell vehicles; thus, auctioneers must set 
their commissions to make sure there are a sufficient numbers 
of buyers and sellers at a given auction. In the case of 
heterosexual “singles” bars, bar owners must attract both men 
and women and often set different prices for men and women 
to attract each gender in the desired proportions. Newspapers 
derive their revenues from both subscribers and advertisers; 
thus, the prices that newspapers set for subscribers and the 
prices they set for advertising space must be calibrated due to 
the fact that advertisers’ willingness to pay will be determined 
by subscriber-ship. 
 
Dennis L. Weisman and Robert B. Kulick, Price Discrimination, Two-Sided 
Markets, and Net Neutrality Regulation, 13 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 81, 
87-88 (2010); see also Marc Rysman, The Economics of Two-Sided Markets, 25 
J. ECON. PERSP. 125, 125 (2009). 
5 In re Preserving the Open Internet, 25 F.C.C.R. 17,905, 17,919 (released Dec. 
23, 2010) [hereinafter Open Internet Report and Order] (“A broadband provider 
could force edge providers to pay inefficiently high fees because that broadband 
provider is typically an edge provider’s only option for reaching a particular end 
user. Thus broadband providers have the ability to act as gatekeepers.”). 
6 While the debate over the need for regulatory intervention began in the United 
States, many nations now consider this issue. See, e.g., Network Neutrality: 
Challenges and Responses in the E.U. and the U.S., EUR. PARL. DOC. (COM 
IP/A/IMCO/ST/2011-02) (May, 2011), 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201108/20110825ATT
25266/20110825ATT25266EN.pdf; see also Toshiya Jitsuzumi, Discussion on 
Network Neutrality: Japan’s Perspective, 3 COMM. & CONVERG. REV. 71-89 
(2011). 
7 Network neutrality refers to the imposition of nondiscrimination, transparency 
and other requirements on ISPs designed to foster a level competitive playing 
field among content providers and to establish consumer safeguards so that 
Internet users have unrestricted access limited only by legitimate concerns such 
as ISP network management and national security. See Rob Frieden, A Primer 
on Network Neutrality, 43 INTERECONOMICS: REV. EUR ECON. POL’Y 4, 4-5 
(Jan./Feb. 2008). 
4
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to offer priority content delivery to any content provider, 
subscriber, or both willing to pay a surcharge.8 
 The Network Neutrality debate primarily addresses the 
potential for anticompetitive practices to harm consumers, but the 
debate occasionally also addresses the potential for ISPs to favor or 
disadvantage specific content sources.9 Advocates for regulatory 
intervention note that end users have limited broadband access 
options,10 but generally the marketplace for long-haul carriage of 
                                                
8 See Marvin Ammori, Beyond Content Neutrality: Understanding Content-
Based Promotion of Democratic Speech, 61 FED. COMM. L.J. 273 (2009); Dan 
G. Barry, The Effect of Video Franchising Reform on Net Neutrality: Does the 
Beginning of IP Convergence Mean That It Is Time for Net Neutrality 
Regulation, 24 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 421 (2008); T. 
Randolph Beard, Network Neutrality and Industry Structure, 29 HASTINGS 
COMM. & ENT L.J. 149 (2007); Jerry Brito, A Tale of Two Commissions: Net 
Neutrality and Regulatory Analysis, 16 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS (2007); Rob 
Frieden, Assessing the Merits of Network Neutrality Obligations at Low, 
Medium and High Network Layers, 115 PENN ST. L. REV. 49 (2010); Rob 
Frieden, Internet 3.0: Identifying Problems and Solutions to the Network 
Neutrality Debate, 1 INT’L J. COMM. 461 (2007); Rob Frieden, Network 
Neutrality or Bias?—Handicapping the Odds for a Tiered and Branded Internet, 
29 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 171 (2007); Brett Frischmann & Barbara van 
Schewick, Yoo’s Frame and What It Ignores: Network Neutrality and the 
Economics of an Information Superhighway, 47 JURIMETRICS J. 383 (2007); 
Mark A. Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-to-End: Preserving the 
Architecture of the Internet in the Broadband Era, 48 UCLA L. REV. 925 
(2001); Sascha D. Meinrath & Victor W. Pickard, Transcending Net Neutrality: 
Ten Steps Toward an Open Internet, 12 J. INTERNET L. 1 (Dec. 2008); Jennifer 
L. Newman, Keeping the Internet Neutral: Net Neutrality and Its Role in 
Protecting Political Expression on the Internet, 31 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. 
L.J. 153 (2008); Tim Wu & Christopher S. Yoo, Keeping the Internet Neutral? 
Tim Wu and Christopher Yoo Debate, 59 FED. COMM. L.J. 575 (2007); Tim Wu, 
Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH 
L. 141 (2005); Christopher S. Yoo, Beyond Network Neutrality, 19 HARVARD J. 
L. & TECH. 1 (2005); Christopher S. Yoo, Would Mandating Broadband 
Network Neutrality Help or Hurt Competition? A Comment on the End-to-End 
Debate, 3 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 23 (2004). 
9 See Dirk Grunwald, The Internet Ecosystem: The Potential for Discrimination, 
63 FED. COMM. L.J. 411 (2011). 
10  
As of December 2009, nearly 70 percent of households lived 
in census tracts where only one or two wireline or fixed 
wireless firms provided advertised download speeds of at least 
3 Mbps and upload speeds of at least 768 Kbps—the closest 
observable benchmark to the minimum download speed of 4 
Mbps and upload speed of 1 Mbps that the Commission has 
used to assess broadband deployment. About 20 percent of 
households are in census tracts with only one provider 
advertising at least 3 Mbps down and 768 Kbps up. For 
Internet service with advertised download speeds of at least 10 
Mbps down and upload speeds of at least 1.5 Mbps up, nearly 
60 percent of households lived in census tracts served by only 
one wireline or fixed wireless broadband provider, while 
5
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Internet traffic operates more competitively. Notwithstanding such 
upstream competition, content and software applications 
eventually route through a single retail ISP to end users.  
 Recently a long-haul carrier, Level 3, sought FCC 
intervention to resolve a traffic dispute with Comcast.11 Level 3 
had contracted with Netflix to serve as a primary distributor of 
online movies, thereby substantially increasing the volume of 
traffic that Level 3 needs retail ISPs like Comcast to deliver to 
their subscribers.12 In response to the increase in terminating traffic 
generated by Level 3, Comcast imposed a surcharge. Level 3 
objected to being singled out for a surcharge, asserting that 
Comcast had installed an Internet tollbooth for only certain traffic 
that happens to compete with Comcast’s pay-per-view cable 
television service. 
 Another interconnection dispute raising Network Neutrality 
questions occurred when Cablevision, a provider of both 
broadband Internet access and cable television services, could not 
meet a deadline for extending a retransmission consent agreement 
with the Fox Broadcasting Company to continue carrying content 
on Cablevision’s New York systems.13 For a brief period, Fox used 
techniques to identify inbound traffic coming from Cablevision 
subscribers via the Hulu Internet site. To secure additional leverage 
in its cable television retransmission consent negotiations with 
                                                                                                         
nearly 80 percent lived in census tracts served by no more than 
two wireline or fixed wireless broadband providers. 
 
Open Internet Report and Order, supra note 5, at 17923-24 (footnotes omitted).  
11 Level 3 Communications Issues Statement Concerning Comcast's Actions, 
LEVEL 3 (Nov. 29, 2010), http://www.level3.com/en/About-
Us/Newsroom/Press-Release-Archive/2010/2010-11-29-level3-statement-
comcast.aspx. 
12 See Letter from Joseph W. Waz, Jr., Senior Vice President, External Affairs 
and Public Policy Counsel, & Lynn R. Charytan, Vice President, Legal 
Regulatory Affairs, Comcast Corp., to Sharon Gillett, Chief, Wireline 
Competition Bureau (Nov. 30, 2010), 
http://www.comcast.com/MediaLibrary/1/1/About/PressRoom/Documents/Com
castexparte1130.pdf; see also Comcast Corp., 20 Q's—with Accurate A's—About 
Level 3's Peering Dispute, COMCAST VOICES BLOG, (Dec. 7, 2010), 
http://blog.comcast.com/2010/12/20-qs---with-accurate-as---about-level-3s-
peering-dispute.html; Level 3, Level 3 Releases Statement to Clarify Issues in 
Comcast/Level3 Interconnection Dispute, LEVEL 3 (Dec. 3, 2010), 
http://www.level3.com/About-Us/Newsroom/Press-Release-Archive/2010/2010-
12-03-statement-interconnection-dispute.aspx. 
13 See Brian Stelter, Internet Is a Weapon in Cable Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 
2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/20/business/media/20hulu.html; Peter 
Kafka, News Corp. Shuts Off Hulu Access to Cablevision Customers—And 
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Cablevision, Fox blocked Cablevision subscribers, including 
broadband-access-only customers, from accessing video 
programming that the company otherwise made available to 
anyone else accessing the Hulu Web site. 
 The Cablevision-Fox dispute identifies another beachhead 
in the Network Neutrality debate in light of the fact that blocked or 
discriminatory access occurred not at the last mile operated by a 
retail ISP, but far upstream. In this instance the fact that upstream, 
long-haul carriers operate in a competitive marketplace did nothing 
to help subscribers of a particular retail ISP secure access to 
content available to everyone else. Fox could use techniques to 
identify and target Cablevision subscribers for discriminatory 
treatment based on nothing more than the fact that they took 
service from a company with which Fox had a commercial dispute. 
 Under ordinary circumstances, when the volume of traffic 
between Internet peers changes and becomes unbalanced, the 
carrier generating more traffic than it receives bears the financial 
obligation to compensate the terminating carrier. However, peering 
ISPs typically seek to balance out the traffic if possible in lieu of 
resorting to a monetary settlement. For ISPs that concentrate on the 
downstream delivery of content, an offsetting upstream flow of 
traffic may not be available to forestall a surcharge. However, in 
the dispute between Level 3 and Comcast, Level 3 operates a large 
transcontinental network that could have handled more upstream 
traffic from Comcast had Comcast elected to offset the Netflix 
downstream traffic volume. In the case of the Cablevision-Fox 
dispute, absolute blockage occurred because of a broadcast 
television content carriage dispute, which had nothing to do with 
Internet traffic imbalances.  
 Level 3 appears to want the FCC to resolve the traffic 
dispute by prohibiting Comcast from imposing any additional 
surcharge, on top of the Internet access charges Comcast’s 
subscribers pay. Comcast frames the issue narrowly as a peering 
matter between an upstream ISP and the ISP providing last-mile 
termination. The Cablevision-Fox dispute was resolved before 
Cablevision could frame the issue as a Network Neutrality 
violation, an unfair trade practice, or some type of unlawful and 
anticompetitive act. 
 This Article will examine the terms and conditions under 
which Internet carriers switch and route traffic for each of several 
links between a source of content, such as Netflix, and the delivery 
of that content to consumers via a retail ISP. The Article concludes 
that commercial terms and conditions should apply for each 
networking element and that the FCC may lack direct statutory 
authority to intervene based on its determination that the services 
in question qualify as largely unregulated information services. 
7
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Additionally, the FCC may appropriately forebear from regulating 
disputes regarding long-haul telecommunications capacity, such as 
the capacity offered by carriers like Level 3, because sufficient 
competition favors industry self-regulation. Similarly, for peering 
disputes upstream from a retail ISP, the marketplace appears 
sufficiently competitive for ISPs to pursue remedies free of 
regulatory intervention. 
 Despite substantial reasons not to intervene, the FCC 
nevertheless might have to clarify its understanding of what 
subscribers of retail ISP services can expect to receive. Under truth 
in billing and other consumer safeguards, the Commission might 
require ISPs to explain what a subscription guarantees. In addition 
to specifying terms of transmission speed and downloading 
capacity, subscribers should also expect their ISPs to outline the 
procedures they use when receiving content requiring downstream 
termination or when an upstream source of content becomes 
blocked by the actions of a specific party, such as the owner of 
content. This Article concludes that both Netflix customers and 
retail ISP subscribers expect their service providers to guarantee 
delivery of movies and all sorts of Internet traffic respectively. For 
physical delivery of DVDs, Netflix must pay the U.S. Postal 
Service, and for delivery of streaming bits, Netflix must pay Level 
3. However, for Internet traffic involving two or more carriers, the 
paper examines whether other retail ISPs providing last mile 
delivery of content violate their service commitments to 
subscribers by demanding additional payment from upstream 
carriers.  
 
I. FOUR PHASES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
INTERNET ECOSYSTEM 
 
 Over its short history, the Internet has significantly changed 
from a government financed network with limited availability to a 
diversified, commercial “network of networks,”14 increasingly 
available to provide a variety of information, communications, and 
entertainment (ICE) services. Throughout its evolution, the 
Internet has achieved connectivity between and among various 
networks based on government underwriting, or commercial terms. 
                                                
14 History of the Internet, WIKIPEDIA, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_the_Internet(last visited April 24, 2012) 
(“The idea of a computer network intended to allow general communication 
between users of various computers has developed through a large number of 
stages. The melting pot of developments brought together the network of 
networks that we know as the Internet.”). 
8
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While governments incubated the Internet and helped shape 
common operating standards, Internet Service Providers (ISPs) 
were able to operate without taxpayer subsidies, making it feasible 
for the privatization, commercialization and diversification phases 
to occur in quick succession. 
 The four phases in the development of the Internet 
ecosystem identify a limited and decreasing role for governments, 
as either financial underwriters or regulators. However, as the 
Internet matures and diversifies, legitimate concerns about 
anticompetitive conduct and market failures have arisen. In light of 
the positive benefits accruing from a largely libertarian 
environment, advocates for government intervention should 
identify instances where market self-regulation cannot work. 
 The Internet commenced operations as a neutral, non-
discriminating medium. However, commercialization, 
technological development, increased diversity among users, and 
proliferating service options collectively create the ability and 
incentive for ISPs to pursue price and service discrimination based 
on mixed motivations.15 ISPs now face financial incentives to 
diversify services and to offer both retail subscribers and sources 
of content and software applications attractive alternatives to 
“plain vanilla” or “one-size-fits-all” Internet access. The owners of 
many ISPs have vertically and horizontally integrated into many 
different types of Internet services, thereby creating incentives for 
ISPs to pursue price and quality of service discrimination that 
serves diversifying user interests and may also favor the content 
and applications of corporate affiliates and unaffiliated ventures 
willing to pay for priority treatment of their traffic. 
 The migration from government ownership to government 
subsidization and finally to privatization and commercialization 
has motivated ISPs to find new ways to generate more revenue. 
Technological innovations provide the means for ISPs to 
differentiate how they manage traffic flows, including the ability to 
prioritize specific bitstreams and to delay or even block delivery of 
“standard” traffic. As the nature and type of Internet user 
diversifies, ISPs seek to offer different service tiers with different 
prices on the basis of user requirements and intensity of need, such 
as offering premium rates for “power” users who need high 
bandwidth and timely delivery of packets. The techniques that can 
provide priority and preferential services to paying customers can 
                                                
15 See Christopher S. Yoo, Innovations in the Internet's Architecture that 
Challenge the Status Quo, 8 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 79 (2010) 
[hereinafter Yoo, Internet Innovations] (outlining new ISP interconnection 
variations of peering and transiting). 
9
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also provide ways for vertically integrated16 ventures to use 
delivery prioritization techniques to favor affiliates or handicap 
competitors. Similarly, Fox used techniques to identify the ISP 
used by persons seeking access to Fox content via the Hulu 
Internet site. Armed with this information, Fox blocked access to 
its content only to Cablevision subscribers. 
 Although no government or private forum comprehensively 
regulates the Internet, government and private operator decisions, 
primarily in North America and Europe, have had a substantial 
impact on the Internet’s development and governance.17 The 
United States government helped create the Internet through 
research and development support and by serving as an “anchor 
tenant.” The decision to abandon public financing of the major 
U.S. backbone network in 1995 created the opportunity for former 
government contractors to become Tier-118 ISP operators of the 
major backbone networks providing transcontinental and 
transoceanic links. For the most part, largely unregulated private 
parties have the power to make sweeping decisions affecting the 
terms and conditions for network access. However, privatization 
has also created an environment where absent market power 
                                                
16 Vertical integration refers to the combination of separate market activities by 
a single enterprise. See Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the 
Market for the Delivery of Video Programming, 12th Annual Report, 21 
F.C.C.R. 2503, 2575 (2006). 
17 For background on the history of Internet development, see Barry M. Leiner et 
al., A Brief History of the Internet, INTERNET SOCIETY (2003), 
http://www.isoc.org/internet/history/brief.shtml; see also William B. Norton, The 
Evolution of the U.S. Internet Peering Ecosystem, Draft 1.1 (Nov. 19, 2003), 
http://www.equinix.com/pdf/whitepapers/PeeringEcosystem.pdf. 
18  
Relationships between network providers typically fell into 
two categories. Tier-1 ISPs entered into peering relationships 
with one another, in which they exchanged traffic on a 
settlement-free basis and no money changed hands. The 
primary justification for foregoing payment is transaction 
costs. Although the backbones could meter and bill each other 
for the traffic they exchanged, they could avoid the cost of 
doing so without suffering any economic harm so long as the 
traffic they exchanged was roughly symmetrical. Such 
arrangements would not be economical with when the traffic 
being exchanged by the two networks was severely 
imbalanced. Thus tier-1 ISPs will not peer with other networks 
that are unable to maintain a minimum level of traffic volume. 
In addition, peering partners typically require that inbound and 
outbound traffic not exceed a certain ratio. Networks that 
cannot meet these requirements must enter into transit 
arrangements in which they pay the backbone to provide 
connectivity to the rest of the Internet.  
 
Yoo, Internet Innovations, supra note 15, at 84. 
10
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possessed individually or collectively, competition and consumer 
sovereignty dominate.  
  The industrial structure of the Internet has tracked four 
phases: 
1) Incubation: government administration, first 
through the United States Defense Department and 
later through the United States National Science 
Foundation and universities and research institutes 
throughout the world (1980s-1995); 
2) Privatization: governments eliminate financial 
subsidies obligating contractors to assess whether 
and how to operate commercially (1995-1998); 
3) Commercialization: private networks and ventures 
proliferate, creating software applications and 
content that traverse the Internet. The “dotcom 
boom” triggers irrational, excessive investment and 
overcapacity (1998-2001); and 
4) Diversification: after the dotcom bust and market 
re-entrenchment, Internet survivors and market 
entrants expand the array of available services and 
ISPs offer diversified terms, conditions and rates, 
including price and quality of service discrimination 
needed by “mission critical” traffic having high 
bandwidth requirements, e.g., full motion video 
content. 
 
A. Phase 1: Incubation  
 
 Until 1995, the United States government, through the 
Defense Department and later the National Science Foundation 
(NSF), underwrote development and maintenance of the core 
Internet backbone (NSFnet). National governments in other parts 
of the world pursued similar network projects. The Internet began 
as specialized, closed networks between specific operators and 
users. Governments incubated what became the Internet through 
financial subsidies and by being the first major, “anchor tenant” of 
newly created networks.  
 Government stewardship helped expedite the research and 
development of the technologies and the uniform operating 
standards needed to achieve broadly accessible and interconnected 
networking. The engineering necessary to support self-healing, 
redundant, and reliable networks for the military and other 
government users also supported seamless connectivity among the 
many different networks operating throughout the world using 
11
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different vintages of equipment manufactured by many different 
companies.  
 After incubating the Internet as a medium for traffic 
associated with research and education, NSF concluded that it 
could abandon its public financing and a commercial, privatized 
Internet could evolve. NSF’s 1993 public solicitation document19 
anticipated a privatized Internet with a structure much like what we 
have today: a hierarchy of many small ISPs serving localities and 
regions, fewer inter-regional Tier-2 ISPs and even fewer Tier-1 
ISPs serving entire nations with the highest capacity backbone 
networks.  
 At the outset of Internet development government 
contractors engineered national networks accessible primarily by 
government, academic, and research users. With few operators, 
which generally had the same characteristics in terms of user 
population, bandwidth, traffic-switching capabilities, network 
management staffing and geographical reach, the parties could 
agree to simple interconnection and access arrangements. The 
intelligence behind Internet network routing sought to achieve 
efficiency and the ability to route around outages and congestion. 
Because all the ISPs in this phase had roughly the same 
characteristics and traffic volumes, their routing assignments 
generated approximately the same financial burdens. 
 Internet access in this first phase sought primarily to 
achieve better geographical reach and more users with little regard 
to the cost of access and who caused an ISP to incur such costs. 
This promotional phase emphasized the accrual of positive 
networking externalities,20 so much so that the parties did not seek 
to monitor traffic flows. Because few ISPs existed, each having the 
same characteristics and operating with government funding, the 
parties saw little benefit and significant cost in negotiating 
interconnection agreements that required carriers to meter traffic. 
 In this first promotional phase all participating ISPs agreed 
to network “peering,” meaning that they would provide reciprocal 
access to each other’s subscribers in a free exchange of traffic that 
                                                
19 NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION, Solicitation for Network Access Point 
Manager, Routing Arbiter, Regional Network Providers, and Very High Speed 
Backbone Network Services Provider for NSFNET and NREN Program (May 6, 
1993), http://www.intercom.co.cr/internet/research/1993/0506.htm. 
20 A positive network externality exists when the cost incurred by a user of the 
Internet does not fully reflect the benefit derived with the addition of new users 
and points of communications. See John Farrell & Garth Saloner, 
Standardization, Compatibility and Innovation, 16 RAND J. ECON. 70 (1985); 
Michael L. Katz. & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition and 
Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 424 (1985); see also Mark A. Lemley & 
David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 CALIF. L. 
REV. 479 (1998). 
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would take place at a few shared, “public” Network Access Points 
(NAPs).21 The few ISPs operating at this time agreed to receive 
traffic from the other ISPs for onward delivery to the final intended 
destination or to another ISP in exchange for the same traffic 
acceptance and delivery commitment from the other ISPs. This 
barter interconnection commitment triggered no exchange of funds 
based on the “rough justice” expectation that an ISP would deliver 
roughly the same amount of traffic generated by other ISPs that it 
handed off for delivery by those ISPs. 22 In the vernacular of 
telecommunications carriers this arrangement constituted a “bill 
and keep” and “sender keep all” arrangement23 because each ISP 
                                                
21 For helpful background on how peering developed, see Steve Gibbard, 
Economics of Peering, PACKET CLEARING HOUSE (Oct. 2004), 
http://www.pch.net/resources/papers/Gibbard-peering-economics.pdf; Geoff 
Huston, Interconnection Peering and Settlements (Internet Society, INET 
Presentation, 1999), http://www.isoc.org/inet99/proceedings/1e/1e_1.htm; Scott 
Marcus, Global Traffic Exchange among Internet Service Providers, OECD 
BRIEFING (2001), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/45/9/1894955.pdf; Daniel C.H. 
Mah, Explaining Internet Connectivity: Voluntary Interconnection Among 
Commercial Internet Service Providers (March 26, 2003), 
http://tprc.org/papers/2003/181/Explaining_Internet_Connectivity_Mar26-
03.DOC.pdf; William B. Norton, Interconnection Strategies for ISPs, Document 
v.2.0, 
http://pharos.equinix.com/pdf/whitepapers/ISPInterconnectionStrategies2.pdf; 
and Bill Woodcock, White Paper on Transactions and Valuation Associated 
with Inter-Carrier Routing of Internet Protocol Traffic or BGP for Bankers 
(Packet Clearing House, White Paper Version 0.2, Aug. 2000), 
http://www.pch.net/resources/papers/bgp-for-bankers/BGP-for-Bankers-
v02.doc. See also Network Startup Resource Network, Routing, BGP and IXP 
Resources, UNIV. OF OREGON, http://www.nsrc.org/route-bgp-ixp.html; The 
North American Network Operators’ Group, Peering Links, t 
http://www.nanog.org/subjects.html#P. 
22 Dirk Grunwald, The Internet Ecosystem: The Potential for Discrimination, 63 
FED. COMM. L.J. 411, 427 (2011) (“Most . . . peering relationships have been 
historically ‘settlement free’ because they benefit both parties and because 
traffic demands were symmetrical.”). 
23  
In a bill-and-keep or sender-keeps-all arrangement, each 
carrier bills its own customers for the origination of traffic and 
does not pay the other carrier for terminating this traffic. In a 
settlement arrangement, on the other hand, the carrier on 
which the traffic originates pays the other carrier to terminate 
the traffic. If traffic flow between the two networks is 
balanced, the net settlement that each pays is zero, and 
therefore a bill-and-keep arrangement may be preferred 
because the networks do not have to incur costs to measure 
and track traffic or to develop billing systems. As an example, 
the Telecommunications Act of 1996 allows for incumbent 
local exchange carriers to exchange traffic with competitors 
using a bill-and-keep arrangement. 
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retained all revenues it generated from subscriptions for traffic 
carriage regardless of whether it solely provided the transmission 
or whether it handed off the traffic for carriage by other ISPs.  
 
B. Phase 2: Privatization  
 
 NSF’s glide path to privatization largely succeeded with 
former contractors achieving supremacy in both the ownership and 
operation of backbone networks and NAPs. MCI, whose assets 
Verizon now holds, won the solicitation to take over the very high 
speed backbone network that previously had served NSF-
sponsored research institutions including Cornell University, 
supercomputer centers in Pittsburgh and San Diego, and several 
government facilities. MCI upgraded its Asynchronous Transfer 
Mode network from OC-3 (155 megabits per second) to OC-12 
(622 megabits per second). 
 The NSF privatization solicitation also created four private 
NAP locations: 1) Chicago, operated by the Ameritech Bell 
Operating Company, now owned by AT&T, and Bellcore, the 
former research arm of AT&T before its acquisition by 
Southwestern Bell Telephone Company; 2) metropolitan New 
York/Philadelphia, operated by Sprint; 3) San Francisco, operated 
by the Bell Operating Company Pacific Telesis, now owned by 
AT&T, and BellCore, the research and development arm of the 
local telephone companies spun off from AT&T in 1984, and 4) 
Washington, D.C., operated by Metropolitan Fiber Systems, a 
networking firm subsequently acquired by MCI.24 
 With the privatization of the Internet, a hierarchical 
industrial structure developed. At the top of the pyramid stood a 
handful of Tier-1 ISPs whose network size, customer base and 
operational success qualified them for the direct and cost-free 
exchange of traffic. While peering used to predominate as the 
primary mode of the NSF network interconnection, the 
commercialization of the Internet created opportunities for market 
                                                                                                         
Michael Kende, The Digital Handshake: Connecting Internet Backbones, 11 
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 45, 51 n.60 (2003) (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 
252(d)(2)(B)(i) (2000)); see also Barbara Esbin, Internet Over Cable: Defining 
the Future in Terms of the Past 20 (FCC, Working Paper No. 30, 1998) (“The 
sharing of traffic over the interconnected networks forming the Internet on a 
statistical and un-metered ‘settlements’ (or ‘bill & keep’) basis was a hallmark 
of early federal agency involvement in the development of the Internet. This 
system of traffic carriage free of charge became known as ‘peering.’”). 
24 InetDaemon, History of the Internet, 
http://www.inetdaemon.com/tutorials/internet/history.shtml,  
(last visited April 25, 2012). 
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entry by more ISPs and new incentives for all ISPs to charge what 
the market would bear for network access. The composition of 
ISPs expanded and diversified in terms of available bandwidth, 
geographical reach, subscribership, types of available content, etc.  
In light of this diversification and proliferation of ISPs, 
universal peering became unsustainable. ISPs lacking sufficient 
size and importance ultimately became customers of network 
access provided by the Tier-1 and other ISPs. This meant that 
smaller ISPs had to pay the larger Tier-1 ISPs for the privilege of 
accessing the Tier-1 ISP’s customers and network connections. 
The term “transit”—also borrowed from the telecommunications 
vernacular—refers to a negotiated business relationship in which 
one ISP sells access to its customers, its network, and its access to 
other ISP networks it has negotiated. 
Clearly, no ISP beneficiary of cost-free peering appreciated 
the demoted status of having to pay for access as a customer and 
reseller. Yet this demotion appeared to occur on the basis of sound 
business judgment made by individual Tier-1 ISPs and not on the 
basis of collusion or concerted refusals to deal. ISPs in Asia-
Pacific and Africa bore the greatest financial burden in having to 
self-provide lines to and from NAPs in North America and Europe 
as well as the obligation to pay for transit. But smaller ISPs 
everywhere incurred a similar, albeit less-expensive burden as 
well. ISPs in North America generated less telecommunications 
expense in reaching a Tier-1 ISP’s NAP, or Point of Presence, in 
light of the proliferation of such facilities and their close proximity 
to most Tier-1 ISPs. ISPs located in more remote areas had to 
procure at their expense the complete link to Tier-1 ISP facilities, 
even though once installed these two-way links provided Tier-1 
ISPs with a cost-free pathway to the smaller remotely located ISP 
and its subscribers. 
ISPs in remotely located regions objected to having to 
provide typically well financed Tier-1 ISPs a “free ride” for the 
delivery of traffic from the Tier-1 ISPs. Certainly, from a 
telecommunications service orientation, it appeared that the 
remotely located ISP underwrote the full cost of “return” traffic in 
light of the bi-directional nature of telecommunications links 
instead of having to pay half of such cost. However, in the context 
of Internet service, the free ride attribution breaks down. First, the 
Internet seamlessly combines telecommunications bit transport 
conduit function with access to content. Particularly at the time of 
Phase Two in the Internet’s development, ISP subscribers could 
access most of the content available via the Internet for nothing 
more than the cost of their ISP subscription. Put another way, 
when an ISP pays another larger ISP for transit services, the 
smaller ISP acquires access to the larger ISP’s subscribers and the 
15
Frieden: RATIONALES FOR AND AGAINST REGULATORY INVOLVEMENT
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2012
RATIONALES FOR AND AGAINST REGULATORY INVOLVEMENT IN 
RESOLVING INTERNET INTERCONNECTION DISPUTES 
 
 281 
content available from these customers as well as the customers of 
other ISPs with which the larger ISP peers or pays for transit. 
Smaller ISPs had to pay for access to and from larger ISPs in 
North America and Europe, but the smaller ISPs could then 
acquire and deliver content that their subscribers sought. Much of 
the most desired content resided on servers located in North 
America and Europe, meaning that remote ISPs had to secure 
access to be able to deliver the content their subscribers expected 
to access. 
Internet transit access arrangements also do not match the 
limited geographical scope of a telecommunications transit 
arrangement. In telecommunications service, transit arrangements 
typically secure an indirect link for a carrier in one location, 
primarily because this carrier might not have sufficient traffic 
volume to secure a direct link. In Internet service, transit 
arrangements typically provide access to a vast array of networks 
certainly not limited to one country, or carrier. In its most 
expansive role, one Internet transit payment arrangement with one 
major Tier-1 ISP can provide a small, remote ISP with access to 
the Rest of the World, because the Tier-1 ISP has secured 
ubiquitous access and therefore can offer (or, advertise, in the 
Internet vernacular) an extensive list of routing opportunities. 
 
C. Phase 3: Commercialization  
 
 The “irrational exuberance” of the dotcom bubble 
stimulated a gold rush mentality among investors keen on finding 
“ground floor” stock ownership opportunities. Undocumented and 
belatedly refuted claims that the Internet doubled in size on a 
monthly basis encouraged risk taking based on the assumption that 
a rising tide would raise all ships, i.e., that anyone investing at the 
onset of the Information Revolution would reap ample returns. 
Investors sank several hundred billion dollars in incumbent and 
new telecommunications and ISP networks. The resulting glut in 
local and long haul transmission capacity had the impact of 
creating substantial downward pressure on Internet transport cost 
and precluding any pricing discipline by Tier-1 ISPs individually, 
or even collectively had they attempted to collude. Similarly, even 
before the dotcom implosion, several Tier-1 ISPs experienced 
financial distress, but the infusion of more of investment helped 
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D. Phase 4: Diversification  
 
 The popping of the dotcom bubble triggered substantial 
losses in the Internet marketplace and a relatively short period of 
irrational pessimism. The post-dotcom-bubble environment 
appears to emphasize a shorter transition to profitability, but 
substantial funds continue to be invested in business plans 
requiring the use of Internet connections. With less tolerance for 
financial losses, investors expect to see a realistic timetable for 
profitability. Throughout the Internet ecosystem, ventures have a 
greater appreciation for cost control and the need to turn cash flow 
positive quickly. 
 ICE ventures in this fourth phase have to pay close 
attention to costs. This means that the carriers providing traffic 
delivery services will closely monitor traffic flows and have little 
patience for instances where a traffic partner has executed a 
peering agreement but either generates comparatively more 
downstream traffic or lacks the network capacity upstream to route 
traffic it receives from a peer. While relatively few in number, 
perhaps because ISPs generally use Non Disclosure Agreements to 
shroud peering terms and disputes,25 the onset of peering disputes 
creates incentives for a partner to force a renegotiation of terms26 
quickly, possibly leading to conversion from zero cost peering to a 
transit payment when a traffic imbalance arises.27 
 Greater vigilance of traffic volumes and the proliferation of 
Internet-mediated services have also created incentives for ISPs to 
diversify the nature, type, terms, and conditions for network 
interconnection beyond the single peering/transiting dichotomy. 
NDAs make it difficult to identify the new traffic routing and 
interconnection arrangements and which carriers have adopted 
them. However, changing types of traffic and the greater likelihood 
                                                
25 Philip J. Weiser, The Future of Internet Regulation, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
529, 576 (2009) (The “norms [for a blend of FCC and industry self-regulation of 
the Internet] might include requirements to provide some level of transparency 
over the terms of treating a counterpart as a peer deserving of settlement-free 
interconnection as opposed to a customer required to pay for transit.”); see also 
Frank Pasquale, Beyond Innovation and Competition: The Need for Qualified 
Transparency in Internet Intermediaries, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 105 (2010). 
26 “Network providers have also begun to enter into business relationships that 
go beyond peering and transit relationships that dominated the early Internet.” 
Christopher S. Yoo, Innovations in the Internet's Architecture That Challenge 
the Status Quo, 8 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 79, 95 (2010). 
27 For example, in 2008, Sprint and Cogent “de-peered” their networks, causing 
temporary service disruptions between their customers. See Om Malik, Cogent, 
Sprint Disconnect Networks, May Cause Web Slowdown, GIGAOM (Oct. 30, 
2008, 10:50 PM), http://gigaom.com/2008/10/30/cogent-sprint-un-peer-may-
cause-web-slowdown. 
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that not all carriers will hand off and receive equal traffic volume 
necessitate new interconnection agreements. For example, the 
growing market for access to full-motion video content delivered 
on an instantaneous, “real time basis” has stimulated the creation 
of a new type of service provider called Content Delivery Network 
(CDN) that offers guaranteed “better than best efforts” routing of 
traffic.28 Because many CDNs concentrate on the downstream 
delivery of traffic, they may have the volume that would stimulate 
interest in a peering arrangement, but not necessarily the networks 
capable of handling a commensurate upstream flow. 
 The ongoing need to upgrade infrastructure to handle 
increasingly bandwidth intensive applications creates a powerful 
financial incentive for ISPs to change the terms and conditions for 
service both upstream and downstream. Many ISPs initially 
offered retail subscribers an “all you can eat” unmetered service 
plan based on the correct perception that all but early adopters 
would need financial inducements to “test drive” the Internet. Now 
that the Internet marketplace has evolved, many ISPs see 
unmetered service as conferring an unnecessary windfall on high-
volume users to the detriment of the carrier and low-volume users. 
ISPs perceive Network Neutrality initiatives as foreclosing 
necessary pricing flexibility. 
 
II. THE LEVEL 3-COMCAST DISPUTE  
 
 In late 2010, Comcast sought to impose a surcharge on 
traffic volumes generated by Level 3 in light of a significant 
increase in downstream traffic generated by Level 3 after having 
secured the opportunity to serve as the primary carrier for 
delivering Netflix full-motion video content to subscribers. While 
Level 3 agreed to pay the surcharge, the company sought 
regulatory relief at the Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC). Level 3 also launched a public relations campaign to frame 
the dispute in terms of Comcast imposing a “tollbooth” on the 
Internet and singling out Level 3 and Netflix traffic for a surcharge 
to raise the cost of a major alternative to Comcast’s pay- per-view 
movie services.29 Comcast responded with an equally forceful 
                                                
28 David D. Clark & Marjory S. Blumenthal, The End-to-End Argument and 
Application Design: The Role of Trust, 63 FED. COMM. L.J. 357, 364-65 (2011) 
(“Today, much Web content is not delivered to the ultimate recipient directly 
from the Web server belonging to the original creator, but via a content delivery 
network (CDN)—a collection of servers that cache the content and deliver it on 
demand.”). 
29 Level 3 Communications Issues Statement Concerning Comcast’s Actions, 
LEVEL 3 (Nov. 29, 2010), 
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campaign to explain that the dispute simply addressed a 
commercial peering matter.30 Comcast claimed that Level 3’s 
increased traffic triggered the right to demand more compensation 
in light of the higher volume of traffic Comcast delivered to its 
subscribers.31 
 This dispute provides a high profile example of how a 
dispute in one traffic routing segment can impact all other 
segments that combine to provide a complete link from content 
source to end users. Comcast correctly states that Level 3 and it 
had executed a peering agreement for reciprocal and zero-cost 
treatment of traffic, provided the flows remain nearly symmetrical. 
Because Level 3 now has more traffic for Comcast to deliver than 
it receives from Comcast, the typical peering agreement would 
require Level 3 to compensate Comcast if the traffic flows cannot 
return to near parity. Unless the parties can find a way for Level 3 
to receive more traffic from Comcast, Level 3 contractually bears a 
financial obligation to compensate Comcast. 
 On the other hand, Level 3 correctly states that the peering 
agreement it has negotiated with Comcast cannot be examined in a 
vacuum because this agreement covers only one component of a 
complete routing arrangement that involves more carriers, routing 
segments, and opportunities for Comcast to generate revenues. 
Comcast generates hefty profits from its retail cable modem 
service subscriptions32 that offer access to Internet content without 
reserving the option to block, degrade, or conditionally deliver 
traffic only if the content source, or a downstream carrier, agrees to 
pay a surcharge. In other words, Comcast’s unilateral actions to 
demand additional payment from an upstream peer may impact 
whether the company continues to satisfy all explicit or implicit 
service requirements established when Comcast receives 
compensation from retail subscribers for providing access to and 
from the Internet cloud. Surely Comcast’s subscribers have no 
                                                                                                         
http://level3.mediaroom.com/index.php?s=23600&item=65045 (“By taking this 
action, Comcast is effectively putting up a toll booth at the borders of its 
broadband Internet access network, enabling it to unilaterally decide how much 
to charge for content which competes with its own cable TV and Xfinity 
delivered content.”). 
30 See Joe Waz, 10 Facts About Peering: Comcast and Level 3, COMCASTVOICES 
(Nov. 30, 2010), http://blog.comcast.com/2010/11/10-facts-about-peering-
comcast-and-level-3.html (“The bottom line is that this is a good, old-fashioned 
commercial peering dispute. It is not about online video, it is not a net neutrality 
issue, it is not about ‘paid prioritization,’ and it does not involve putting ‘toll 
booths’ on the Internet.”). 
31 See Joe Waz, Comcast Comments on Level 3, COMCASTVOICES (Nov. 29, 
2010), http://blog.comcast.com/2010/11/comcast-comments-on-level-3.html. 
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understanding that the company has conferred a conditional right 
to receive timely delivery of Netflix streaming movie bits if and 
only if an upstream carrier of those bits agrees to pay additional 
compensation when traffic streams become unbalanced. 
 What the Level 3-Comcast dispute addresses and which 
carrier makes the more persuasive argument depends on the 
geographical scope of analysis. If one solely examines the link 
between Level 3 and Comcast, then the matter looks like a peering 
dispute. Also if one interprets the subscription agreement between 
Comcast and retail subscribers as solely addressing the first and 
last links to the Internet cloud, then the matter does not necessarily 
factor in what subscribers expect their monthly Internet access 
payments to cover. But if the dispute examines both sides of the 
traffic Comcast handles, then the matter integrates both what 
Comcast can properly demand from upstream sources of traffic 
and what the company must do with that traffic to meet its service 
commitments to downstream retail subscribers. 
 
III. THE CABLEVISION-FOX DISPUTE  
 
 At first impression, one might not see any link between the 
Level 3-Comcast dispute and the one involving Cablevision and 
Fox. The latter began as a financial dispute over the level of 
compensation Cablevision should pay Fox for the right to carry 
and deliver Fox’s broadcast-television content to Cablevision’s 
cable-television subscribers in New York. This retransmission 
dispute added an Internet-access element when Fox used 
techniques to identify traffic generated by Cablevision subscribers 
in the form of an upstream request for Fox content via the Hulu 
content aggregation web site. When Hulu forwarded to Fox the 
request to download Fox broadcast television content, Fox could 
use technology to identify content-specific downloading requests 
initiated by Cablevision subscribers. Rather than process the 
content request forwarded to it by Hulu, Fox refused to deliver the 
content and instead sent a notification to the Cablevision 
broadband subscriber explaining the reason for denied access.33 
 Cablevision subscribers, including ones only paying for 
Internet access, received a notification stating that because 
Cablevision currently had lost the right to retransmit Fox broadcast 
                                                
33 Peter Kafka, News Corp. Shuts Off Hulu Access to Cablevision Customers—
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signals, Cablevision subscribers likewise lost the option to 
download portions of Fox broadcast content that was otherwise 
available to anyone else with a broadband connection to Hulu. Fox 
did not block traffic flows at the last mile linking retail ISP and 
end user; instead, it blocked traffic flows far upstream at the 
source. The company sought to maximize its negotiating leverage 
with Cablevision on the broadcast television carriage matter by 
denying Cablevision subscribers the option of receiving portions of 
the now-blocked content via an alternative method. 
 Fox and Comcast both have resorted to tactics designed to 
enhance their negotiating leverage with a partner in the carriage of 
Internet-delivered content. In the process, end users were denied 
access to something they believed they were entitled to receive, 
particularly in light of the fact that they continued to pay for the 
privilege through Internet access and cable television subscription 
fees during the dispute. In both instances, one commercial venture 
can exploit a content bottleneck to deny access, either by blocking 
a request for a video file stored on a server the company controls 
or by refusing to deliver that file to paying retail subscribers. 
Regardless of the merits in their disputes with a traffic-routing 
partner, the tactics of both Comcast and Fox show that the 
incentive and technical ability exist to distort, block and 
manipulate traffic flows to serve strategic goals. In both instances, 
consumers were denied access to content as negotiating leverage to 
resolve a financial dispute in one company’s favor. 
 
IV. DOES THE FCC HAVE JURISDICTION TO RESOLVE 
INTERNET CLOUD DISPUTES? 
  
 The Level 3-Comcast and Cablevision-Fox disputes 
involve Internet traffic links other than the first and last mile 
provided by retail ISPs. Nevertheless, these disputes directly affect 
consumers when they cannot view content that would ordinarily be 
available to them. The potential for direct and adverse impact on 
Internet consumers refutes the view that both disputes involve only 
commercial transactions among unregulated ventures for which the 
FCC has no basis to monitor or possibly sanction. On the other 
hand, the potential to harm consumers does not by itself provide 
the basis under which the FCC can assume jurisdiction to impose a 
remedy. Set out below are rationales for and against regulatory 
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A.  Rationales Favoring FCC Intervention 
  
 The traffic-routing segments that combine to provide a 
complete Internet link from content source to end user include the 
services of one or more carriers that deliver packets and files. 
Reasonable people can disagree whether any portion of the link 
between content provider and retail delivery to end users 
constitutes a basic telecommunication service,34 instead of an 
information service,35 the category applicable to Internet access. 
This threshold determination matters because if the entire link 
from end users to sources of content constitutes an information 
service, then the FCC and other NRAs typically lack direct and 
specific regulatory authority even to remedy clear instances of 
anticompetitive practices. 
 While retail ISPs might fully qualify for a largely 
unregulated information services “safe harbor”36 created by 
Congress in the Telecommunications Act of 1996,37 carriers 
                                                
34 The Communications Act of 1934, as amended, defines “telecommunications 
service” as “the offering of telecommunications for a fee directly to the public, 
or to such classes of users as to be effectively available directly to the public, 
regardless of the facilities used.” 47 U.S.C. § 153(53) (2010). 
“Telecommunications” is defined as “the transmission, between or among points 
specified by the user, of information of the user’s choosing, without change in 
the form or content of the information as sent and received.” 47 U.S.C. § 
153(50).  
35 “Information service” is defined as “the offering of a capability for generating, 
acquiring, storing, transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making 
available information via telecommunications, and includes electronic 
publishing, but does not include any use of any such capability for the 
management, control, or operation of a telecommunications system or the 
management of a telecommunications service.” 47 U.S.C. § 153(24). These 
services qualify for a largely unregulated status. 
36 A safe harbor constitutes “[a]n area or means of protection [or a] provision (as 
in a statute or regulation) that affords protection from liability or penalty.” 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1363 (8th ed. 2004). In light of the lack of a bright 
line distinction between regulated telecommunications services and largely 
unregulated information services, a service provider possibly can secure a 
competitive advantage through regulatory arbitrage where it seeks reduced 
regulatory oversight by characterizing telecommunications services as 
information services. The FCC defined “regulatory arbitrage” as “businesses 
making decisions based on regulatory classifications rather than on customers’ 
preferences and innovative and sustainable business plans.” In re Inquiry 
Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet over Cable and Other Facilities, 
17 F.C.C.R. 4798 ¶ 90, at 4846 (released Mar. 15, 2002); see also Rob Frieden, 
Regulatory Arbitrage Strategies and Tactics in Telecommunications, 5 N.C. J. L. 
& TECH. 227 (2004) (identifying strategies used to secure a competitive 
advantage by exploiting differences in the cost of doing business created by 
regulatory classifications).  
37 110 Stat. 56 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.). 
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operating upstream arguably do not fully and completely shoehorn 
their services into this category. To qualify for the largely 
unregulated information service classifications, service providers 
must use information-processing techniques to enhance and add 
value to the basic “building blocks” of telecommunications 
transmission. The FCC expressly notes that packet switched 
networks, like those providing Internet bit transmission, do not 
automatically qualify: “The Commission has for many years 
recognized that packet switched interstate transmission services 
may appropriately be classified as telecommunications services.”38 
When it first addressed the regulatory classification issue, the 
Commission emphasized the retail link provided by ISPs to end 
users and acknowledged that upstream service might not operate in 
the same manner.39 Final rules determining the applicability of the 
information service classification explicitly focus on Internet 
access provided on a retail basis to end users: 
 
Wireline broadband Internet access service, for 
purposes of this proceeding, is a service that uses 
existing or future wireline facilities of the telephone 
network to provide subscribers with Internet access 
capabilities. The term “Internet access service” 
refers to a service that always and necessarily 
combines computer processing, information 
provision, and computer interactivity with data 
transport, enabling end users to run a variety of 
applications such as e-mail, and access web pages 
and newsgroups. Wireline broadband Internet 
access service, like cable modem service, is a 
functionally integrated, finished service that 
inextricably intertwines information-processing 
                                                
38 In re Compass Global, Inc., 23 F.C.C.R. 6125, 6135 (adopted Apr. 8, 2008) 
(citing Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced 
Telecommunications Capacity, 13 F.C.C.R. 24,012 (released Aug. 7, 1998)). 
39 “The Commission recognized, however, that its analysis focused on ISPs as 
entities procuring inputs from telecommunications service providers. Thus, 
classifying Internet access as an information service in this context left open 
significant questions regarding the treatment of Internet (and information) 
service providers that own their own transmission facilities and that engage in 
data transport over those facilities to provide an information service.” In re 
Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to Internet over Wireline 
Facilities, 17 F.C.C.R. 3019, 3027-28 (released Feb. 15, 2002) (citing In re 
Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, 13 F.C.C.R. 11,501 ¶ 69, at 
11534 (released Apr. 10, 1998)). 
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capabilities with data transmission such that the 
consumer always uses them as a unitary service.40 
 
 One should appreciate the context in which the FCC issued 
its Wireline Internet Access Report and Order. Having received 
Supreme Court affirmation of its decision to exempt cable modem 
Internet access,41 the Commission sought to level the competitive 
playing field and burnish its deregulatory reputation by including 
Internet access via Digital Subscriber Lines. But even as it was 
striving to find a basis to free all retail broadband Internet access 
services, the Commission offhandedly did note that it was 
addressing only the link providing the first and last mile service to 
end users: “[T]he current record does not support a finding or 
compulsion that the transmission component of wireline broadband 
Internet access service is a telecommunications service as to the 
end user.”42 
 The Internet cloud is comprised of telecommunication 
networks operated by carriers whose operations in the United 
States fall squarely under Title II of the Communications Act, as 
amended.43 Even though the FCC has recognized that a 
competitive market supports streamlined regulation, including the 
elimination of some requirements, such as the filing of public 
service contracts known as tariffs,44 the Commission cannot 
completely eliminate the applicable title II regulatory foundation.45 
 On its own initiative or in response to complaints, the FCC 
has direct statutory authority to investigate the practices of Title II 
regulated carriers, a category that certainly applies to carriers that 
participate in the long-haul transmission of Internet traffic and 
                                                
40 In re Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over 
Wireline Facilities, 20 F.C.C.R. 14,853 ¶ 9, at 14860 (released Sept. 23, 2005) 
(footnotes omitted). 
41 Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 
(2005). 
42 In re Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over 
Wireline Facilities, 20 F.C.C.R. ¶ 106, at 14912. 
43 47 U.S.C. § 201 et seq.  
44 The FCC first created a dichotomy between carriers still having market power 
and ones subject to sufficiently robust competition. Policy and Rules 
Concerning Rates for Competitive Common Carrier Services and Facilities 
Authorizations Therefor, First Report and Order, 85 FCC 2d 1 (1980), cert. 
denied sub nom. MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T, 113 S. Ct. 3020 (1993). The 
FCC largely deregulated interexchange, long distance telephone service. 
Competition in the Interstate Interexchange Marketplace, Report and Order, 6 
F.C.C.R. 5880 (1991). 
45 For example, in MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. FCC, 765 F.2d 1186 (D.C. Cir. 
1985), the court vacated an FCC order attempting to eliminate the tariff filing 
requirement for competing long distance telephone companies because Congress 
had not yet provided the Commission with statutory authority to do so. 
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arguably can apply, in part, to ISPs that deliver the traffic onward 
to end users. The FCC used this rationale to penalize an ISP 
providing Digital Subscriber Line (DSL) service46 that denied its 
broadband subscribers opportunities to originate or receive Voice 
over the Internet Protocol (VoIP) service.47 Similarly, the FCC 
could sanction an ISP that refuses to deliver traffic received from 
an upstream carrier with which the ISP has a dispute over 
compensation.  
 Arguably, the stakes are higher when an ISP blocks access 
to content than when a broadcaster denies a cable television 
operator access to content.48 Most consumers could install an 
antenna to receive the prohibited content, and retransmission 
disputes typically get resolved before or soon after broadcasters 
deny access to content. In the Internet context, the traffic-
terminating carrier has a functional monopoly because subscribers 
typically select only one ISP to handle all of their upstream and 
downstream traffic.49 It would take consumers significant time and 
effort to secure an alternative carrier capable of restoring content 
access on similar terms and conditions.50 Additionally, the 
                                                
46 In re Madison River Commc’ns., L.L.C., 20 F.C.C.R. 4295 (2005) (small 
independent telephone company agreed to a $15,000 monetary forfeiture and 
consent decree agreeing not to block Digital Subscriber Link customers’ access 
to Voice over the Internet Protocol telephone services). 
47 VoIP service offers a voice telephone service alternative to conventional 
wired and wireless dialup services. Rather than use a dedicated switched circuit, 
VoIP traffic is divided into digital packets routed and switched through the 
Internet cloud for all or part of the complete route. For technical background on 
how VoIP works, see Susan Spradley & Alan Stoddard, Tutorial on Technical 
Challenges Associated with the Evolution to VoIP, FCC (Sept. 22, 2003), 
http://www.fcc.gov/events/tutorial-technical-challenges-associated-evolution-
voip; and Charles J. Cooper & Brian Stuart Koukoutchos, Federalism and the 
Telephone: The Case for Preemptive Federal Deregulation in the New World of 
Intermodal Competition, 6 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 293 (2008).  
48 See Lee L. Selwyn & Helen E. Golding, Revisiting the Regulatory Status of 
Broadband Internet Access: A Policy Framework for Net Neutrality and an 
Open Competitive Internet, 63 FED. COMM. L.J. 91 (2010). 
49 In re Preserving the Open Internet, 24 F.C.C.R. 13,064, 13094 (adopted Oct. 
22, 2009) (“[E]ven if there is competition among broadband Internet access 
service providers, once an end-user customer has chosen to subscribe to a 
particular broadband Internet access service provider, this may give that 
broadband Internet access service provider the ability, at least in theory, to favor 
or disfavor any traffic destined for that subscriber.”).  
50 “[M]any end users may have limited choice among broadband providers . . . . 
Moreover, those that can switch broadband providers may not benefit from 
switching if rival broadband providers charge edge providers similarly for 
access and priority transmission and prioritize each edge provider’s service 
similarly. Further, end users may not know whether charges or service levels 
their broadband provider is imposing on edge providers vary from those of 
alternative broadband providers, and even if they do have this information may 
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Commission could identify the public interest benefits in 
uninterrupted service, for which subscribers might incur costs and 
inconvenience in finding an adequate alternative carrier and 
installing replacement equipment such as a modem compatible 
with the new network. 
 In its correspondence with the FCC, Comcast characterized 
the dispute with Level 3 as a private commercial peering matter for 
which the FCC lacks jurisdiction. Comcast sought to frame the 
dispute in the context of two related and competitive markets, both 
fully functional absent government oversight. The two-sided 
markets served by Comcast involve upstream content sources and 
ISPs as well as the retail Internet access services Comcast provides 
end users. Opponents of Network Neutrality note that operators in 
the two-sided Internet access market have incentives for 
underpricing retail services to stimulate subscribership and demand 
for upstream services that ISPs such as Comcast could charge at 
profit-maximizing rates.51 For example, television broadcasters opt 
to provide content free of charge to end users with an eye toward 
maximizing audiences for which advertisers pay rates based on 
market penetration.  
 No evidence supports the premise that Comcast 
deliberately underprices retail Internet access subscriptions or, 
more broadly, that broadband service competition in the United 
States forces carriers to provide service at comparatively low 
rates.52 Likewise, the upstream commercial terms currently in use 
                                                                                                         
find it costly to switch.” In re Preserving the Open Internet, 25 F.C.C.R. 17,905, 
¶ 27, at 17,921 (adopted Dec. 21, 2010) (footnotes omitted). 
51  
Examples abound in two-sided markets of very low, even 
negative, prices on one side of the market and relatively high 
prices on the other side of the market. These include Yellow 
Pages, free television, and various software programs like 
Adobe Acrobat. In this last example, the Adobe reader is free, 
but the Adobe writer commands a relatively steep price. Two 
observations are noteworthy. First, uniform pricing is rare in 
two-sided markets; it is much more common to observe 
differential prices across the two sides of the market. Second, 
one side of the market may actually prefer to face a relatively 
high price to the extent that it results in a lower price on the 
other side of the market, and hence a higher level of 
participation on that side. 
 
Weisman & Kulick, supra note 4, at 92-93 (footnotes omitted).  
52 See, e.g., Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development, 
Broadband Portal, Average monthly subscription price for connections between 
2.5 and 15 Mbps advertised download speed (Sept. 2010), 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/22/46/39575020.xls. The main OECD Broadband 
Portal is available at:  
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typically involve a type of barter, i.e., peering, in lieu of financial 
payments. If Comcast and other ISPs sought to execute a profit 
maximizing, two-sided market strategy using conventional tactics, 
the company would charge end users less with an eye toward 
replacing peering with a traffic-based delivery charge. Instead, 
most ISPs appear inclined to raise end user Internet access charges, 
by offering tiers of service based on bit delivery speeds and how 
much content a subscriber can download in one month. Until the 
Comcast-Level 3 dispute, there appeared to be no indication that 
existing peers sought to replace their barter arrangement with 
selectively imposed surcharges applicable to specific upstream 
peers. 
 
1.  Ancillary Jurisdiction  
 
 The FCC also may have a basis for intervening even if a 
court were to reject the view that Title II authority applies to 
Internet traffic flows between an ISP and end users or to an ISP 
and other upstream ISPs and content sources. Neither the FCC nor 
reviewing courts have extended the information services 
classification upstream from the ISP-end user link. On the 
contrary, the Madison River investigation and financial sanction 
supports limited FCC authority even for the ISP-end user link. 
Accepting for the sake of analysis whether any alternatives exist to 
direct Title II authority, alternative direct statutory authority might 
exist elsewhere in the Communications Act.  
 
2. Titles I, III, and VI of the Communications Act 
 
 The FCC has achieved a mixed appellate record in its 
attempt to assert ancillary jurisdiction53 in the absence of an 
                                                                                                         
http://www.oecd.org/document/54/0,3746,en_2649_34225_38690102_1_1_1_1,
00.html. 
53 The FCC relies on a claim of ancillary jurisdiction when the Commission 
lacks explicit statutory authority. The FCC successfully invoked ancillary 
jurisdiction to regulate cable television even before the Commission received a 
statutory mandate to do so.  
 
The FCC needed a hook to assert jurisdiction over cable. To 
reach that goal, it used a two-step process. First, the 
Commission found that cable was within its primary statutory 
grant of authority under section 152(a) of the 
[Communications] Act, which allows the FCC to regulate ‘all 
interstate and foreign communication by wire or radio.’ 
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explicit statutory mandate. Reviewing courts endorsed the FCC’s 
regulation of cable television, in light of its potential to impact 
adversely the ability of regulated television broadcasters to offer 
free, advertiser-supported content.54 Similarly, the Supreme Court 
endorsed both the FCC’s abandonment of Title II regulatory 
oversight of Internet access and the Commission’s retention of 
some residual Title I authority going forward.55 However, when 
the FCC attempted to apply the Court’s apparent deference to Title 
I authority to sanction Comcast for deliberately meddling with 
subscribers’ traffic in the absence of compelling network 
management need, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals refused to 
affirm the Commission’s action based on the lack of a sufficiently 
clear link to statutory authority.56 The FCC continues to test the 
scope of its Title I ancillary jurisdiction by claiming authority to 
impose nondiscrimination and other so-called Network Neutrality 
requirements on ISPs, notwithstanding the Comcast holding that 
rejected the Commission’s jurisdictional authority to sanction 
anticompetitive practices of an ISP.57  
                                                                                                         
Second, the FCC invoked section 303(r) of the Act, which 
allows the Commission to issue ‘such rules and regulations 
and prescribe such restrictions and conditions, not inconsistent 
with law,’ as ‘public convenience, interest, or necessity 
requires.’ The FCC also referenced section 154(i), which 
provides that ‘[t]he Commission may perform any and all acts, 
make such rules and regulations, and issue such orders, not 
inconsistent with [the Communications Act], as may be 
necessary in the execution of its functions.’ 
 
Kevin Werbach, Off the Hook, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 535, 572 (Mar. 2010) 
(citations omitted). 
54 United States v. Sw. Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968); see also FCC v. 
Midwest Video Corp. (Midwest Video II), 440 U.S. 689 (1979); United States v. 
Midwest Video Corp. (Midwest Video I), 406 U.S. 649 (1972) (affirming the 
FCC’s assertion of jurisdiction to impose mandatory broadcast signal carriage 
rules). 
55 “Information-service providers, by contrast, are not subject to mandatory 
common-carrier regulation under Title II, though the Commission has 
jurisdiction to impose additional regulatory obligations under its Title I ancillary 
jurisdiction to regulate interstate and foreign communications.” National Cable 
& Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 976 (2005). “The 
Act’s definitions, however, parallel the definitions of enhanced and basic 
service, not the facilities-based grounds on which that policy choice was based, 
and the Commission remains free to impose special regulatory duties on 
facilities-based ISPs under its Title I ancillary jurisdiction. In fact, it has invited 
comment on whether it can and should do so.” Id. at 996. 
56 Comcast Corp. v. F.C.C., 600 F.3d 642 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
57 In re Preserving the Open Internet, 24 F.C.C.R. 13,064 (proposed Oct. 22, 
2009); In re Preserving the Open Internet, Report and Order, 25 F.C.C.R. 
17,905 (released Dec. 23, 2010).  
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 Attempts by both Comcast and Fox to block or subject 
specific traffic streams to discriminatory practices may trigger a 
claim of lawful jurisdiction to remedy anticompetitive practices 
that occur when a participating ISP or content source targets 
particular traffic streams. The basis for imposing Network 
Neutrality safeguards in these two instances involves a carrier or 
content provider tactic to discipline a peer or penalize a class of 
content consumers based on their having subscribed to a venture in 
a service dispute with the content provider. The FCC can claim 
that its intervention does not impose common carrier requirements, 
but it instead offers consumer safeguards when a venture can use 
negotiating tactics that deprive consumers of lawful content, a 
policy created by the FCC on a nonpartisan basis in 2005.58 
 Lastly, ISP interconnection disputes and a content provider 
denying access to a specific class of broadband subscriber calls 
into question what rights and reasonable service expectations ISP 
subscribers have. Broadband consumers expect their retail ISP to 
provide access to the Internet cloud at a promised bit rate and 
without the option of blocking, dropping, and otherwise denying 
subscribers opportunities to access lawful content, i.e., content that 
does not cause technical harm to the ISP network or fit within 
several categories of subscriber-specified undesirable content—for 
example, unsolicited commercial messages commonly known as 
spam. Similarly, ISPs have a contractual duty to use their best 
efforts to deliver promised services. 
 The FCC has prevailed over all legal objections to its 
imposition of service commitments on VoIP operators even as 
these requirements match common carrier telephone company 
duties and reduce VoIP operators’ competitive attractiveness and 
cost advantages over conventional dial-up services. While VoIP 
arguably constitutes a type of information service,59 the FCC has 
managed to avoid having to make that determination even as the 
Commission requires VoIP operators to incur the same obligations 
of Title II regulated common carrier telephone companies.60 VoIP 
                                                
58 In re Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet Over 
Wireline Facilities, 20 F.C.C.R. 14,986 (released Sept. 23, 2005).  
59 VoIP customers initiate and receive calls via their broadband links, e.g., DSL 
and cable modem services. The FCC considers broadband access an information 
service. In re High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other 
Facilities, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798, 4802, (2002), aff’d, Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. 
Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005); In re Appropriate 
Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet Over Wireline Facilities, 20 
F.C.C.R. 14,853 (adopted Aug. 25, 2005). It follows that software and other 
applications carried via information service links similarly qualify as 
information services. 
60 “To date, the Commission has not classified interconnected VoIP service as 
either an information service or a telecommunications service. The Commission 
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service providers that can receive or deliver calls to conventional 
wired and wireless networks must contribute to universal service 
funding programs designed to promote affordable dial-up 
telephone service,61 make arrangements to support subscriber 
access to emergency 911 service,62 cooperate with law 
enforcement authorities,63 incorporate the technical 
accommodations telephone companies provide persons with 
disabilities (such as deaf callers),64 support the ability of existing 
subscribers to keep their existing telephone numbers when 
switching service,65 and report service outages to the FCC.66 
 The FCC can impose possibly competition-reducing 
regulatory requirements on VoIP service providers based on a 
reference to Title I of the Communications Act that provides the 
basis for asserting ancillary jurisdiction when no direct statutory 
authorization exists.67 Because VoIP competes with conventional 
                                                                                                         
has, however, extended certain obligations to providers of such service, 
including local number portability, 911 emergency calling capability, universal 
service contribution, CPNI protection, disability access and TRS contribution 
requirements, and section 214 discontinuance obligations.” In re Connect 
America Fund, 26 F.C.C.R. 4554, 4582 (released Feb. 9, 2011) (citations 
omitted).  
61 In re Universal Serv. Contribution Methodology, 21 F.C.C.R. 7518, 7538 
(proposed June 27, 2006) (extending section 254(d) permissive authority to 
require interconnected VoIP providers to contribute to the USF. 
62 In re IP-Enabled Servs., 20 F.C.C.R. 10,245 (proposed May 19, 2005). 
63 In re Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act & Broadband 
Access & Servs., 20 F.C.C.R. 14,989 (2005).  
64 In re IP-Enabled Servs., 22 F.C.C.R. 11,275 (released June 15, 2007); In re 
IP-Enabled Servs., 22 F.C.C.R. 18,319 (released Oct. 9, 2007) (granting in part 
and denying in part waivers of the FCC order). See also In re Contributions to 
the Telecommunications Relay Servs. Fund, 26 F.C.C.R. 3285 (proposed Mar. 
3, 2011).  
65 In re Telephone Number Requirements for IP Enabled Services Providers, 22 
F.C.C.R. 19,531 (released Nov. 8, 2007); In re Local Number Portability Porting 
Interval and Validation, 25 F.C.C.R. 6953 (released May 20, 2010) (establishing 
fast deadlines for conversions).  
66  The Proposed Extension of Part 4 of the Commission’s Rules Regarding 
Outage Reporting to Interconnected Voice Over Internet Protocol Service 
Providers and Broadband Internet Service Providers, PS Docket No. 11-82, FCC 
12-22 (report and order) (Feb. 21, 2012), 
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-12-22A1.doc. 
67 The FCC relies on a claim of ancillary jurisdiction when the Commission 
lacks explicit statutory authority. The FCC successfully invoked ancillary 
jurisdiction to regulate cable television even before the Commission received a 
statutory mandate to do so.  
 
The FCC needed a hook to assert jurisdiction over cable. To 
reach that goal, it used a two-step process. First, the 
Commission found that cable was within its primary statutory 
grant of authority under section 152(a) of the 
[Communications] Act, which allows the FCC to regulate “all 
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wired and wireless services, subject to Title II regulation, the 
Commission can impose the very same requirements on VoIP 
carriers despite the lack of specific Title II authority. Reviewing 
courts have affirmed the Commission’s jurisdiction as well as its 
preemption of the states from imposing a different regulatory 
regime or none at all.68 
 Arguably, an ISP leveraging access to its customers and 
threatening to block such access does not satisfy the fiduciary duty 
of care the carrier’s subscription agreement requires. The promise 
to deliver Internet access presumably includes a duty to take 
affirmative steps to maintain interconnection agreements, 
particularly for traffic end users expecting to receive, for example, 
timely delivery of full-motion video content from Netflix. Comcast 
may have available an alternative to simply demanding more 
compensation from Level 3: rearranging its upstream traffic 
requirements so that Level 3 provides more carriage. Comcast’s 
peering contract with Level 3 and its subscription contract with end 
users both obligate the company to attempt to remedy traffic 
imbalances in ways that reduce the likelihood of disconnection and 
“de-peering.” Rather than first resorting to a surcharge demand, 
arguably Comcast should have an affirmative obligation to pursue 
routing adjustments so that both Level 3 and Comcast broadband 
subscribers do not experience service disruptions. 
 
 
                                                                                                         
interstate and foreign communication by wire or radio.” 
Second, the FCC invoked section 303(r) of the Act, which 
allows the Commission to issue “such rules and regulations 
and prescribe such restrictions and conditions, not inconsistent 
with law,” as “public convenience, interest, or necessity 
requires.” The FCC also referenced section 154(i), which 
provides that “[t]he Commission may perform any and all 
acts, make such rules and regulations, and issue such orders, 
not inconsistent with [the Communications Act], as may be 
necessary in the execution of its functions.” 
 
Kevin Werbach, Off the Hook, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 535, 572 (Mar. 2010) 
(citations omitted). The Supreme Court affirmed the FCC’s claim of ancillary 
jurisdiction. United States v. Sw. Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968); see also John 
Blevins, Jurisdiction as Competition Promotion: A Unified Theory of the FCC’s 
Ancillary Jurisdiction, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 585 (2009); Andrew Gioia, FCC 
Jurisdiction over ISPs in Protocol-Specific Bandwidth Throttling, 15 MICH. 
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 517 (2009); James B. Speta, The Shaky 
Foundations of the Regulated Internet, 8 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 101 
(2010). 
68 Vonage Holding Corp. v. The Minnesota Public Utilities Comm’n, 290 F. 
Supp. 2d 993, 994 (D. Minn. 2003) (upholding FCC preemption of state VoIP 
regulation). 
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B. Rationales Opposing FCC Intervention  
 
 The arguments against FCC regulation emphasize the 
assumption that any Internet access service wherever situated 
constitutes an information service; the FCC’s general reluctance to 
intervene in Internet disputes; and the D.C. Circuit Court of 
Appeals’ determination that the FCC lacks direct statutory 
authority and cannot stretch ancillary authority even to remedy 
anticompetitive practices of ISPs.69 The global application of the 
information service classification surely would make legally 
questionable just about any FCC attempt to regulate the Internet, 
regardless of noble intentions. 
 Stopping the FCC requires confirmation that no 
telecommunications service element exists for any of the links 
between end users and their retail ISP, between the retail ISP and 
others upstream, and between retail ISPs and ventures that lease 
telecommunications lines used for both Internet traffic and other 
types of traffic. The FCC recognizes that telecommunications—as 
opposed to telecommunications services—does constitute a 
component in the delivery of Internet traffic. 70 However the 
                                                
69 Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding that the FCC 
lacked statutory authority to sanction Comcast for meddling with subscriber 
traffic in ways that could competitively favor Comcast services). 
70 To justify its decision to apply the information-service classification to 
services that combine telecommunications transmission and content, the FCC 
insisted that the telecommunications component could not be singled out: 
 
[W]e reject arguments that companies using their own 
facilities to provide wireline broadband Internet access service 
simultaneously provide a telecommunications service to their 
end user wireline broadband Internet access customers. The 
record demonstrates that end users of wireline broadband 
Internet access service receive and pay for a single, 
functionally integrated service, not two distinct services. This 
conclusion also is consistent with certain past Commission 
pronouncements that the categories of “information service” 
and “telecommunications service” are mutually exclusive. 
Moreover, the fact that the Commission has, up to now, 
required facilities-based providers of wireline broadband 
Internet access service to separate out a telecommunications 
transmission service and make that service available to 
competitors on a common carrier basis under the Computer 
Inquiry regime has no bearing on the nature of the service 
wireline broadband Internet access service providers offer 
their end user customers. We conclude now, based on the 
record before us, that wireline broadband Internet access 
service is, as discussed above, a functionally integrated, 
finished product, rather than both an information service and a 
telecommunications service.  
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Commission considers the telecommunications aspects of Internet 
access to end users as so integrated with information services as to 
become subordinate and unseverable. 71 In its Wireline Internet 
Access Report and Order, the FCC considered the regulatory 
classification of the “Broadband Internet Access Transmission 
Component.”72 If one were to infer that this component lies not just 
between the ISP and end users, but also upstream from the retail 
ISP to other ISPs, carriers, and content providers, then the 
information service classification appropriately can apply 
throughout the Internet cloud. Because the Commission explicitly 
decided not to use its ancillary jurisdiction to impose regulatory 
safeguards in the Wireline Internet Access Report and Order, direct 
statutory authority to regulate would occur if and only if an ISP or 
carrier providing telecommunications lines to an ISP opted to 
designate some or all of its offerings as a telecommunications 
service. In other words, the basis for FCC regulatory intervention 
would exist only if one or more carriers “voluntarily undertakes to 
provide . . . a telecommunications service,”73 because the 
Commission expressly declined to compel “the offering of a 
telecommunications service to ISPs.”74 
 ISPs have managed to achieve global connectivity through 
commercial peering and transit arrangements free of government 
intrusion. With rare exception, ISPs voluntarily have entered into 
these interconnection arrangements and have managed to resolve 
disputes without government intervention and with only rare 
instances of service disruptions. In light of apparently effective 
industry self-regulation, the FCC wisely has shown restraint when 
addressing claims of Internet market failure.75 
                                                                                                         
 
In re Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over 
Wireline Facilities, 20 F.C.C.R. 14,853, 14,911 (Sept. 23, 2005). 
71 For analysis of the sometimes-metaphysical difference between 
telecommunications and telecommunications service, see Rob Frieden, What Do 
Pizza Delivery and Information Services Have in Common? Lessons From 
Recent Judicial and Regulatory Struggles with Convergence, 32 RUTGERS 
COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 247 (2006).  
72 See In re Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over 
Wireline Facilities, 20 F.C.C.R. 14,853, 14,909 (proposed Sept. 23, 2005). 
73 Id. at 14,910. 
74 Id. 
75  
[W]e believe ‘broadband services should exist in a minimal 
regulatory environment that promotes investment and 
innovation in a competitive market.’ In this regard, we seek to 
remove regulatory uncertainty that in itself may discourage 
investment and innovation. And we consider how best to limit 
unnecessary and unduly burdensome regulatory costs.  
 
33
Frieden: RATIONALES FOR AND AGAINST REGULATORY INVOLVEMENT
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2012
RATIONALES FOR AND AGAINST REGULATORY INVOLVEMENT IN 
RESOLVING INTERNET INTERCONNECTION DISPUTES 
 
 299 
 ISPs have demonstrated the ability to resolve disputes 
without the need for government intervention, in part because 
ample alternative routing opportunities exist upstream from the 
retail ISP.76 Because the Level 3-Comcast and Cablevision-Fox 
disputes address such non-retail routing elements, traffic routing 
irregularities are not exacerbated by the lack of alternative routing 
options. Actual or threatened traffic blockage results from the lack 
of competition downstream at the retail ISP level, or from the fact 
that blockage occurred as a result of actions taken by a content 
source and not any ISP participating in the routing of such content 
downstream.  
 Narrowing the focus of the Level 3-Comcast dispute solely 
to the transmission link between the two carriers, one can assert 
that a predictable event has triggered the need for a commercial 
adjustment to a preexisting contract. A significant increase in 
downstream traffic, not offset by a commensurate increase in 
upstream traffic, results in an imbalance of traffic. When traffic 
streams become asymmetrical in a peering agreement the carrier 
generating more traffic bears financial responsibility to 
compensate the carrier now handling the higher traffic volume. 
Comcast’s imposition of a financial surcharge appears to be a 
reasonable and nondiscriminatory response to changed 
circumstances. Had the routing imbalance occurred the other way, 
with Comcast generating more traffic than it received from Level 
3, Comcast would have incurred a higher financial burden.  
                                                                                                         
In re Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and 
Other Facilities Internet Over Cable Declaratory Ruling, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798, 4802 
(2002) (quoting In re Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the 
Internet Over Wireline Facilities, Universal Service Obligations of Broadband 
Providers, CC Docket No. 02-33, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 F.C.C.R. 
3019, 3021 (2002), affirmed sub nom., National Cable & Telecommunications 
Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005)). 
76  
Even deliberate attempts by major ISPs to interfere with traffic 
flow as a competitive tactic fail. For example, in March 2008, 
Cogent Communications and the Swedish provider 
TeliaSonera stopped accepting traffic from each other's 
networks (known as “de-peering”). Cogent claimed that 
TeliaSonera failed to provide adequate bandwidth at 
interconnection points, and TeliaSonera argued that Cogent 
owed it compensation for carrying traffic. However, Swedes 
could still reach sites hosted on Cogent’s network, and vice 
versa; it appears that the only entity made inaccessible by the 
dispute was Martha Stewart Living, and only from Sweden. 
Other ISPs carried traffic between the warring firms, slowing 
access but enabling it to continue. 
 
Derek E. Bambauer, Conundrum, 96 MINN. L. REV. 584, 617-18 (2011) 
(footnotes omitted). 
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 The likelihood of asymmetrical traffic flows between 
carriers otherwise interested in serving as peers has promoted the 
parties to negotiate a variation of the peering model.77 Paid peering 
involves an arrangement between two ISPs that handle traffic in 
both directions but expect a traffic imbalance. If an ISP’s business 
plan focuses on becoming a Content Distribution Network (CDN) 
for the delivery of streaming video to end users, that type of ISP is 
certain to generate more downstream traffic than it will receive 
upstream. CDNs do not balk at the obligation of compensating 
ISPs that deliver traffic downstream. 
 Level 3’s agreement to handle Netflix downstream traffic 
triggered the traffic imbalance. Level 3 presumably negotiated an 
agreement that compensates the carrier for the predictable 
payments it would have to make when its now-higher downstream 
traffic volume results in an imbalance. When Netflix opts to send 
movie compact disks via conventional postal mail, the company 
surely expects to compensate the postal service. So too should 
Netflix and its Internet carrier bear the financial obligation to 
compensate participating carriers downstream. 
 
V. WHAT SHOULD THE FCC DO?  
 
 The FCC recently has experienced a political and judicial 
drubbing when attempting to resolve real instances of 
discriminatory and potentially anticompetitive conduct undertaken 
by ISPs. The Commission should act cautiously in light of having 
questionable jurisdiction over Internet issues and the fact that the 
ISPs have managed to operate largely free of regulation while 
satisfying subscribers’ service expectations. On the other hand, 
disputes have occurred that necessitated the Commission’s limited, 
ad hoc intervention. Such disputes may grow in number as ISPs 
diversify services, as may the models used for calculating 
interconnection compensation.  
 The vast majority of past and future Internet 
interconnection disputes have reached or will reach closure without 
FCC intervention or a judicial remedy. Just as the FCC refrains 
from intervening in cable television retransmission consent 
negotiations, even ones that have triggered a disruption in service, 
the Commission also should refrain from proactively intervening in 
peering disputes and actual or threatened denials of access to 
content. However, there will be instances where the parties cannot 
                                                
77 See Yoo, Internet Innovations, supra note 16. 
 
35
Frieden: RATIONALES FOR AND AGAINST REGULATORY INVOLVEMENT
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2012
RATIONALES FOR AND AGAINST REGULATORY INVOLVEMENT IN 
RESOLVING INTERNET INTERCONNECTION DISPUTES 
 
 301 
reach an agreement, in part because one side benefits from delay, 
particularly when consumers temporarily lose access to content.  
 The FCC should provide its “good offices” to resolve 
disputes when a party seeks the Commission’s intervention by 
filing a complaint. The FCC has direct statutory authority to 
resolve carrier-to-carrier disputes regardless of whether some or all 
of the content carried over transmission facilities constitutes an 
information, broadcasting, or cable service. The fact that services 
delivered to an end user may qualify for an unregulated safe harbor 
does not by itself convert the upstream links into similarly 
unregulated carriage. When Level 3 provides long-haul transport 
for another carrier or ISP, Level 3 arguably provides a 
telecommunications service for hire subject to Title II. Similarly 
when Fox disconnects or otherwise deprives end users of access to 
content otherwise available to broadband subscribers whose ISP 
has no current dispute with Fox, the FCC has direct statutory 
authority to investigate the public interest consequences of such 
disconnections. 
 
A. Case Law Supporting FCC Authority To Resolve 
Interconnection Complaints  
 
 On a number of occasions involving many different aspects 
of facilities interconnection, the FCC has responded to complaints 
or initiated an investigation on its own accord. The range of FCC 
involvement runs the gamut including resolution of disputes 
among cable television operators and broadcasters; VoIP 
subscribers and their broadband carrier; wireless telephone and 
data service carriers; and owners of conduits and poles, such as 
electric utilities not otherwise subject to FCC oversight, and 
lessees, such as cable television operators and ISPs. 
 
 
1. Must Carry/Retransmission Consent and Other Types of 
Mandatory Content Access 
 
 In addition to questions about whether the FCC has lawful 
jurisdiction, compulsory interconnection and carriage of content by 
cable television operators raise questions about compelled speech 
and diminution of First Amendment speaker rights.78 Must carry 
                                                
78 ISPs appear keen on both asserting and denying questionable First 
Amendment speaker rights. In the former, ISPs seek to deem their network 
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requirements possibly substitute specific broadcast channels for 
content cable operators otherwise would produce or acquire.79 
Despite such constraints on speech and property ownership, the 
Supreme Court has confirmed that the FCC can lawfully require 
cable television operators to deliver broadcast content to 
subscribers and to make available channels for educational, 
government, public, and leased access.80 Courts have affirmed the 
FCC’s assertion of ancillary jurisdiction to impose such carriage 
obligations even before Congress expressly mandated it. In effect 
the FCC can lawfully impose a compulsory duty to deal on a type 
of private, non-common carrier. Must carry imposes a duty to 
interconnect and deliver traffic even for ventures that do not 
constitute Title II regulated common carriers.  
 The line of must carry cases shows that the FCC can order 
interconnection and a duty to deal even among non-common 
carriers. In other words, a duty to interconnect does not derive 
solely from Title II of the Communications Act. Title VI-regulated 
cable television operators have to deal with Title III-regulated 
broadcasters. It does not appear to be a jurisdictional stretch for the 
FCC to infer that its conditional Title II oversight of carriers 
provides long haul transmission of Internet traffic.81 The 
                                                                                                         
management functions as a type of expression, even if executed by software. In 
the latter, ISPs emphasize their network conduit function to qualify for 
exemption from potential tort and copyright liability. See Rob Frieden, Invoking 
and Avoiding the First Amendment: How Internet Service Providers Leverage 
Their Status as Both Content Creators and Neutral Conduits, 12 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 1279 (June 2010). 
79 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997) (must-carry requirement 
imposed on cable television operators using an intermediate scrutiny standard 
and concluding that carriage requirements are reasonable and not content-based 
in that they promote the financial viability of television broadcasters and not any 
specific type of content); see also Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 
622, 663 (1994) (approving FCC “must-carry” requirements despite the lack of 
direct statutory authorization); Satellite Broad. & Commc’n Ass’n v. FCC, 275 
F. 3d 337 (4th Cir. 2001) (carry-one carry-all rule mandated by the Satellite 
Home Viewer Improvement Act); Nissa Laughner & Justin Brown, Cable 
Operators’ Fifth Amendment Claims Applied to Digital Must-Carry, 58 Fed. 
Comm. L.J. 281, 305 (2006).  
80 Time Warner Entm’t Co. v. FCC, 93 F.3d 957, 982 (D.C. Cir. 1996) 
(upholding as constitutional provisions of the 1992 Cable Act which, among 
other things, required cable operators to provide leased access and public, 
educational and governmental channels). 
81 As James Speta observes, 
 
One could conclude that the FCC simply has no authority to 
regulate Internet carriers, at all. But that would ignore the 
Supreme Court's statements in Brand X, and only the Supreme 
Court is free to call its own statements dicta. And arguments 
that the FCC has no authority over anything that Internet 
carriers do runs head-long against the ancillary jurisdiction 
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combination of its public interest duties and the general 
jurisdiction over wire and radio confers authority on the FCC to 
resolve an interconnection dispute between two ISPs. It may also 
follow that the FCC could order Fox to refrain from obstructing the 
delivery of its content to ISPs having the duty to deliver 
unconditional access to lawful content for their subscribers.  
 The FCC appears so confident of its statutory authority to 
address broadcaster-cable television operator interconnection 
issues that it has undertaken an initiative to help resolve 
retransmission disputes in a timely manner.82 Retransmission 
consent negotiations have become more contentious and in some 
instances the parties have not reached closure before cable 
                                                                                                         
cases which say that the FCC does have some regulatory 
authority over entities engaged in communications by wire or 
radio, even if those entities are not otherwise mentioned in the 
Act. 
What is needed, then, is a doctrinally sound, more 
narrowly-tailored view of the FCC's ancillary jurisdiction over 
Internet carriers. Internet carriers are those entities providing 
“communications by wire or radio” that the FCC has classified 
as providing information services. A cable company, 
broadband over power line, or any wireless company 
providing Internet access service would qualify, but content 
and applications providers would not. The FCC’s ancillary 
authority should be recognized in circumstances where the 
Internet carrier is providing or carrying a service regulated by 
the Communications Act.  
 
James B. Speta, The Shaky Foundations of the Regulated Internet, 8 J. 
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 101, 120 (2010). 
82 The FCC has expressed similar concerns about the timeliness of negotiations 
between prospective competitors to incumbent cable television operators and 
local franchising authorities (LFAs). The Commission imposed limitations on 
what LFAs can require of market entrants and also established a deadline for 
their deliberation. In re Implementation of Section 621(A)(1) of the Cable 
Communications Policy Act of 1984 as Amended by the Cable Television 
Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, 22 F.C.C.R. 5107 (2007) 
(report and order and further notice of proposed rulemaking), cert. denied sub 
nom. Alliance for Community Media v. F.C.C., 129 S. Ct. 2821 (2009). 
In Alliance for Community Media v. F.C.C., 529 F.3d 763 (6th Cir. 
2008), the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the FCC’s video franchising 
rules based on the court’s finding that ambiguity in the Communications Act 
afforded the Commission an opportunity to make reasonable statutory 
interpretations worthy of judicial deference. The court held that the FCC 
reasonably interpreted Section 621(a)(1) of the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. 
§ 541(a)(1) (1996), as establishing no limits on the Commission’s rulemaking 
authority despite providing no explicit delegation of authority to determine 
whether and how local franchising authorities unreasonably refuse to award an 
additional competitive franchise. The court concluded that the FCC acted well 
within its statutorily delineated authority in enacting the Franchising Order and 
that there exists sufficient record evidence to indicate that the FCC did not 
engage in arbitrary-and-capricious rulemaking activity.  
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operators have had to deny their subscribers access to highly 
desirable broadcast television content. The FCC has issued a 
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking seeking comment on a series of 
proposals to provide greater specificity on what the parties must do 
to satisfy the statutory requirement that they negotiate in good 
faith.83 Additionally, the Commission proposes to improve notice 
to consumers in advance of possible service disruptions, extend to 
non-cable multi-channel video programming distributors (MVPDs) 
the prohibition now applicable only to cable operators on deleting 
or repositioning a local commercial television station during 
ratings “sweeps” periods, and allow MVPDs to negotiate 
alternative access to network programming by eliminating the 
Commission’s network non-duplication and syndicated exclusivity 
rules that preclude cable operators from delivering substitute 
content readily available from another broadcaster. 
 The FCC takes pains to emphasize its intent not to usurp 
marketplace-driven negotiations between broadcasters and MVPDs 
or to exceed its statutory authority by mandating interim carriage 
of broadcast signals during retransmission consent negotiations or 
imposing a duty for the parties to submit to mandatory binding 
dispute resolution procedures.84 Having jurisdiction to assess 
whether broadcasters have negotiated in good faith with MVPDs,85 
the Commission believes that it can promote faster resolution of 
disputes by specifying additional examples of what constitutes a 
per se violation of the Section 76.65(b)(1) requirement that parties 
                                                
83 Amendment of the Commission’s Rules Related to Retransmission Consent, 
MB Docket No. 10-71, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, MB Docket 10-71, FCC 
11-31 (Mar. 3, 2011),  
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-11-31A1.doc 
[hereinafter Retransmission Consent NPRM]. 
84 Id. at ¶ 18 (“We do not believe that the Commission has authority to adopt 
either interim carriage mechanisms or mandatory binding dispute resolution 
procedures applicable to retransmission consent negotiations.”); Id. at ¶ 17 
(“Our goal in this proceeding is to take appropriate action, within our existing 
authority, to protect consumers from the disruptive impact of the loss of 
broadcast programming carried on MVPD video services. Subscribers are the 
innocent bystanders adversely affected when broadcasters and MVPDs fail to 
reach an agreement to extend or renew their retransmission consent contracts. In 
light of the changing marketplace, our proposals in this NPRM are intended to 
update the good faith rules and remedies in order to better utilize the good faith 
requirement as a consumer protection tool.”).  
85 Id. at ¶ 8 (“Congress required the Commission to revise its regulations so that 
they ‘prohibit a television broadcast station that provides retransmission consent 
from . . . failing to negotiate in good faith, and it shall not be a failure to 
negotiate in good faith if the television broadcast station enters into 
retransmission consent agreements containing different terms and conditions, 
including price terms, with different multichannel video programming 
distributors if such different terms and conditions are based on competitive 
marketplace considerations.’” (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 325(b)(3)(C)(ii) (2006)).  
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negotiate in good faith86 and by further clarifying what is meant by 
the standard in Section 76.65(b)(2)87 that requires the Commission 
to consider the totality of the circumstances affecting 
retransmission consent negotiations. 
 
2. Madison River  
 
 The FCC asserted jurisdiction over a Digital Subscriber 
Line (DSL) broadband access provider that deliberately blocked 
                                                
86 Section 76.65(b)(1) of the Commission’s Rules establish seven criteria for 
assessing the sufficiency of good faith in retransmission consent negotiations:  
 
 The following actions or practices violate a broadcast 
television station’s or multichannel video programming 
distributor’s (the ‘Negotiating Entity’) duty to negotiate 
retransmission consent agreements in good faith:  
(i) Refusal by a Negotiating Entity to negotiate retransmission 
consent;  
(ii) Refusal by a Negotiating Entity to designate a 
representative with authority to make binding representations 
on retransmission consent;  
(iii) Refusal by a Negotiating Entity to meet and negotiate 
retransmission consent at reasonable times and locations, or 
acting in a manner that unreasonably delays retransmission 
consent negotiations;  
(iv) Refusal by a Negotiating Entity to put forth more than a 
single, unilateral proposal;  
(v) Failure of a Negotiating Entity to respond to a 
retransmission consent proposal of the other party, including 
the reasons for the rejection of any such proposal;  
(vi) Execution by a Negotiating Entity of an agreement with 
any party, a term or condition of which, requires that such 
Negotiating Entity not enter into a retransmission consent 
agreement with any other television broadcast station or 
multichannel video programming distributor; and  
(vii) Refusal by a Negotiating Entity to execute a written 
retransmission consent agreement that sets forth the full 
understanding of the television broadcast station and the 
multichannel video programming distributor. 
 
47 C.F.R. § 76.65 (2009). 
87 Retransmission Consent NPRM, supra note 76 at ¶ 10 (“[E]ven if the seven 
specific standards are met, the Commission may consider whether, based on the 
totality of the circumstances, a party failed to negotiate retransmission consent 
in good faith.”). The FCC appears to imply that, even if a Negotiating Entity can 
prove that it satisfied all specific criteria evidencing good faith, an opponent 
may demonstrate, based on the totality of the circumstances of a particular 
retransmission consent negotiation, that a television broadcast station or 
multichannel video programming distributor breached its duty to negotiate in 
good faith.  
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subscribers from accessing third party VoIP services.88 The 
Commission secured a $15,000 forfeiture and executed a Consent 
Decree with the Madison River Telephone Company, which 
agreed not to interfere with DSL subscribers’ use of the company’s 
network to originate and receive VoIP telephone calls. The 
Commission could assert jurisdiction, which Madison River opted 
not to challenge, even though DSL access constitutes an 
information service. A reasonable interpretation of ancillary 
jurisdiction includes an expectation that even non-common carrier 
broadband access providers cannot engage in discriminatory and 
anticompetitive practices aiming to thwart subscribers from 
lawfully using their broadband access to launch and receive a 
telephone service alternative to that provided by the DSL carrier. 
 
3. Data Roaming  
 
 The FCC also has determined that a carrier providing a 
retail wireless information service does not insulate itself from 
having an interconnection obligation with other wireless carriers 
simply because the service is not treated as a Title II regulated 
common carrier service.89 The Commission had no difficulty 
deciding that wireless carriers have a duty to interconnect so that 
subscribers using their handsets outside their local calling area can 
continue to make and receive voice telephone calls.90 Only AT&T 
and Verizon objected to an extension of the roaming 
interconnection requirement to data services.91 The public interest 
benefits in supporting roaming subscriber access to a wireless 
                                                
88 Madison River Commc’ns, LLC, Order & Consent Decree, 20 F.C.C.R. 4295 
(March 3, 2005). 
89 In re Reexamination of Roaming Obligations of Commercial Mobile Radio 
Service Providers and Other Providers of Mobile Data Services, 26 F.C.C.R. 
5411 (released Apr. 7, 2011) [hereinafter Mobile Data Roaming Order], notice 
of appeal filed by Verizon May 13, 2011. 
90 In re An Inquiry Into the Use of the Bands 825-845 MHz and 870-890 MHz 
for Cellular Communications Systems and Amendment of Parts 2 and 22 of the 
Commission's Rules Relative to Cellular Communications Systems, 86 F.C.C.2d 
469 (released May 4, 1981); In re Reexamination of Roaming Obligations of 
Commercial Mobile Radio Service Providers, 22 F.C.C.R. 15,817, 15,818 
(released Aug. 16, 2007); see also 47 C.F.R. §§ 20.3, 20.12(d) (codifying 
roaming requirement). 
91 “We reject arguments by AT&T and Verizon Wireless that a data roaming 
rule is unnecessary because data roaming agreements are occurring without 
regulation. We find that providers have encountered significant difficulties 
obtaining data roaming arrangements on advanced ‘3G’ data networks, 
particularly from the major nationwide providers.” Mobile Data Roaming Order, 
supra note 8, at 5424.  
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network are the same regardless whether the interconnection 
supports a voice telephone call or Internet access. As the Internet 
becomes an increasing important medium for all sorts of 
converging services, the lawful right of access to data networks 
becomes even more important and necessary. 
 Recently the Commission sought to impose common 
carrier interconnection responsibilities on wireless carriers when 
their data service customers seek access to the network of another 
carrier while roaming outside the customer’s home service 
territory. The Commission’s Second Report and Order on data 
roaming obligations of facilities-based wireless carriers requires 
interconnection backed up with the power to resolve formal 
complaints if commercially driven negotiations fail. The two 
Republican Commissioners dissented from the order based on the 
view that the FCC lacks jurisdiction to compel wireless ISPs to 
interconnect.92 The Democratic majority relied primarily on the 
view that Title III confers broad regulatory power over any venture 
using licensed spectrum, not just radio and television broadcasters. 
 Rather than claim ancillary jurisdiction based on Title I of 
the Communications Act, the FCC used an expansive 
interpretation of Title III to achieve the same outcome, while 
avoiding the inconvenient fact that the Commission treats wireless 
broadband and data services as information services not subject to 
Title II oversight.93 The Commission creates a non-common carrier 
duty to deal; that is, wireless carriers must interconnect their data 
networks and provide access to roaming data service subscribers 
who take service from another unaffiliated carrier.94 The 
                                                
92 Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Robert M. Mcdowell, 26 F.C.C.R. 
5483 (2011); Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Meredith Attwell Baker, 
26 F.C.C.R. 5487 (2011). 
93 In re Appropriate Regulatory Treatment for Broadband Access to the Internet 
Over Wireless Networks, 22 F.C.C.R. 5901, 5915 (2007) (“Having determined 
that wireless broadband Internet access service, regardless of whether offered 
using mobile, portable, or fixed technologies, is an information service under the 
Act, we now address the applicability of the ‘commercial mobile service’ 
provision of section 332 of the Act to this broadband service. As discussed 
below, we find that ‘mobile wireless broadband Internet access service’ is not a 
’commercial mobile service’ as that term is defined in the Act and as 
implemented in the Commission’s rules.”).  
94 Mobile Data Roaming Order, supra note 81 at ¶ 1 (“[W]e promote consumer 
access to nationwide mobile broadband service by adopting a rule that requires 
facilities-based providers of commercial mobile data services to offer data 
roaming arrangements to other such providers on commercially reasonable 
terms and conditions, subject to certain limitations. Widespread availability of 
data roaming capability will allow consumers with mobile data plans to remain 
connected when they travel outside their own provider's network coverage areas 
by using another provider's network, and thus promote connectivity for and 
nationwide access to mobile data services such as e-mail and wireless broadband 
Internet access. The rule we adopt today also serves the public interest by 
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Commission considers it necessary to remedy the apparent absence 
of competitive necessity for the dominant national wireless carriers 
to offer reciprocal data roaming agreements, particularly to 
smaller, regional operators. The FCC correctly identified a 
problem that could prevent consumers from relying on their 
smartphones as mobile computers when seeking Internet access 
outside their local calling area, a likely occurrence for many users.  
 The FCC imposes a duty to deal on carriers based primarily 
on their use of spectrum and the Commission’s broad mandate to 
service the public interest. By concentrating on Title III and the 
broad mandate in Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 
1996 to promote Internet access, the Commission hopes it can 
impose a conventional common carrier interconnection obligation 
even in the absence of explicit statutory authority.  
 Because Title II cannot apply directly to data roaming, the 
FCC frames the interconnection obligation as a “spectrum usage 
condition”95 and not a common carrier obligation. The 
Commission presumes that this characterization makes it possible 
to maneuver around the limitation contained in Section 332 of the 
Communications Act, as amended, that limits the application of 
streamlined Title II common carrier obligations only to voice 
services that connect with conventional wireline telephone 
networks.96 The Commission summarily states that it does not have 
to make the determination whether and how Sec. 332 applies, if, 
more broadly, all or other sections within Title III apply. 
 The FCC attempts to differentiate compulsory data roaming 
interconnection from common carriage by emphasizing that 
wireless carriers will not apply single, tariffed terms and 
conditions. Wireless carriers typically negotiate voice or data 
                                                                                                         
promoting investment in and deployment of mobile broadband networks, 
consistent with the recommendations of the National Broadband Plan. The 
deployment of mobile data networks is essential to achieve the goal of making 
broadband connectivity available everywhere in the United States, and the 
availability of data roaming will help ensure the viability of new wireless data 
network deployments and thus promote the development of competitive 
facilities-based service offerings for the benefit of consumers. Today’s actions 
will therefore advance our goal of ensuring that all Americans have access to 
competitive broadband mobile data services.” 
95 Id. at ¶ 66.  
96 47 U.S.C. § 332(8)(d)(1-2) (2006) (“For purposes of this section—(1) the term 
‘commercial mobile service’ means any mobile service (as defined in section 
153 of this title) that is provided for profit and makes interconnected service 
available (A) to the public or (B) to such classes of eligible users as to be 
effectively available to a substantial portion of the public, as specified by 
regulation by the Commission; (2) the term ‘interconnected service’ means 
service that is interconnected with the public switched network (as such terms 
are defined by regulation by the Commission) or service for which a request for 
interconnection is pending pursuant to subsection (c)(1)(B) of this section.”).  
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roaming on an individualized, carrier-specific basis. Nevertheless, 
it appears that the FCC has created a duty to deal for wireless 
carriers that must offer nondiscriminatory terms and conditions to 
one or more “similarly situated” wireless carriers. In other words, 
the common carrier duty to provide service to all subscribers 
“indifferently” can result in a tariff or contract serving just one 
user or carrier, because no other user or carrier has similar usage 
requirements. For example, the fact that the United States 
government might have specific and large requirements unmatched 
by other users does not by itself convert service from Title II 
regulated common carriage to private carriage or convert wireless 
telephone companies into information service providers. 
 
4. Pole Attachments 
 
 The FCC has statutory authority to require enterprises not 
customarily subject to its regulatory oversight to provide access to 
poles and duct capacity.97 Facing complaints about the timeliness 
of access negotiations and the appropriateness of the compensation 
demanded, the Commission believes it has statutory authority to 
delve more deeply into the negotiation process. The FCC reformed 
its pole attachment rules to streamline access and reduce costs for 
attaching broadband lines and wireless antennas to utility poles 
across the country.98 The Commission considers pole access 
reform a key element in finding ways to expedite access to 
affordable broadband services, a key mission of the National 
Broadband Plan.99 The Commission identified three major 
impediments for which it provides solutions:  
                                                
97 Congress directed the Commission to “regulate the rates, terms, and 
conditions of pole attachments to provide that such rates, terms, and conditions 
are just and reasonable, and . . . adopt procedures necessary and appropriate to 
hear and resolve complaints concerning such rates, terms, and conditions.” 47 
U.S.C. § 224(b)(1) (2006); see also Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n,Inc. v. Gulf 
Power Co., 534 U.S. 327 (2002) (applying Pole Attachment Act to attachments 
by cable television systems that provide Internet service in addition to traditional 
cable service, without regard to the classification of the commingled cable 
modem service). 
98 In re Implementation of Section 224 of the Act, WC Docket No. 07-245, 
Report and Order and Order on Reconsideration, FCC 11-50 (Apr. 7, 2011), 
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-11-50A1.doc 
[hereinafter Pole Attachment Report and Order]. 
99 Id. at ¶ 3 (“In its efforts to identify barriers to affordable telecommunications 
and broadband services, the Commission has recognized that lack of reliable, 
timely, and affordable access to physical infrastructure—particularly utility 
poles—is often a significant barrier to deploying wireline and wireless 
services.”).  
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First, the process and timeline for negotiating access 
to poles varies across the various utility companies 
that own this key infrastructure. The absence of 
fixed timelines and the potential for delay creates 
uncertainty that deters investment. Second, if a pole 
owner does not comply with applicable 
requirements, the party requesting access may have 
limited remedies; because of time constraints, cost, 
or the need to maintain a working relationship with 
the pole owner, it may not wish to pursue the 
enforcement process. Third, the wide disparity in 
pole rental rates distorts service providers’ decisions 
regarding deployment and offering of advanced 
services. For example, providers that pay lower pole 
rates may be deterred from offering services, such 
as high-capacity links to wireless towers, which 
could fall into a separate regulatory category and 
therefore risk having a higher pole rental fee apply 
to the provider’s entire network.100 
 
 Acting on the statutory authority contained in Section 224 
of the Communication Act,101 the FCC determined that it should 
provide greater structure and timelines for the commercial 
negotiations that occur between pole owner and a lessee. Because 
the pole owner may have monopoly control over a facility needed 
by a broadband provider and because the broadband provider may 
not have a practical means to construct its own poles or conduits, 
the FCC recognized “the need to establish a more detailed 
framework to govern the rates, terms and conditions for pole 
attachments.”102 The Commission adopted rules establishing a 
specific timeline for access, improvements to its enforcement 
process, a revised formula for the telecommunications access rate, 
and a process to ensure just and reasonable rates, terms, and 
conditions for pole attachments by incumbent LECs which initially 
owned much of the poles they used but increasingly have to 
negotiate for access like other carriers. 
 
                                                
100 Id. 
101 Congress directed the Commission to “regulate the rates, terms, and 
conditions of pole attachments to provide that such rates, terms, and conditions 
are just and reasonable, and . . . adopt procedures necessary and appropriate to 
hear and resolve complaints concerning such rates, terms, and conditions.” 47 
U.S.C. § 224(b)(1) (2006). 
102 Pole Attachment Report and Order, supra note 89, at ¶ 5. 
45
Frieden: RATIONALES FOR AND AGAINST REGULATORY INVOLVEMENT
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2012
RATIONALES FOR AND AGAINST REGULATORY INVOLVEMENT IN 
RESOLVING INTERNET INTERCONNECTION DISPUTES 
 
 311 
5. Truth in Billing, Avoiding Bill Shock, and Sanctions for 
Deliberate Overcharges 
 
 The FCC has determined that it has statutory authority to 
safeguard consumers by requiring many different service providers 
to provide understandable bills, to help subscribers avoid 
unexpected charges triggered by exceeding allotted use and to 
sanction a wireless carrier for overcharges involving an 
information service. The Commission relies on Title III to regulate 
the billing practices of ventures that use radio spectrum and more 
generally applies Title I ancillary jurisdiction: 
 
We note that our jurisdiction to regulate certain 
consumer equipment and non-Title II services 
delivered via various media is well established. . . . 
[W]hile Title II obligations have never generally 
applied to information services, when we have 
determined that regulatory requirements are 
necessary for  performing our duties under the 
Communications Act, we may impose such 
regulations pursuant to our Title I ancillary 
jurisdiction.103 
 
 The FCC also applied its Title II common carrier regulatory 
authority to sanction Verizon Wireless for billing its subscribers 
for unintentional initiation of an Internet access data session.104 
The company generated at least $52.8 million in increments of 
$1.99 when a subscriber inadvertently pressed a button that 
triggered charges for Internet access even when the subscriber had 
no intent to start a data session and no idea that a meter was 
running. The Commission also secured a voluntary contribution of 
$25 million from Verizon probably in light of the carrier’s 
knowledge of the overcharges and disinclination to stop the 
overcharges and provide refunds.105 Verizon wisely did not 
challenge the FCC’s jurisdiction to order a remedy based on the 
view that the Commission had no statutory basis to investigate and 




                                                
103 In re Consumer Information and Disclosure, 24 F.C.C.R. 11,380, ¶ 
61(released Aug. 28, 2009).  
104 Verizon Wireless Data Usage Charges, 25 F.C.C.R. 15,105 (2010). 
105 Id. at 15,113. 
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 The FCC has lawful statutory authority to remedy disputes 
among carriers and between carriers and subscribers when the 
parties cannot reach a timely settlement. This public service is not 
prevented by the fact that all or part of the service in question 
involves something other than common carriage. The FCC is not 
statutorily prohibited from remedying carrier disputes even if one 
of the carriers qualifies for an unregulated safe harbor such as 
information service or uses telecommunications lines to deliver 
broadcast content to broadband customers via an information 
service.  
 However, the Commission must act with substantial 
restraint in light of the limited statutory authority to intervene and 
a healthy reluctance on the part of many courts to defer entirely to 
the Commission’s determination of the length and breadth of its 
ancillary jurisdiction. FCC intervention should focus on whether 
and how the disputing parties have a duty to deal with each other, 
primarily by interconnecting their separate networks. The 
Commission should not try to determine the appropriate rate for 
interconnection and should make every effort to facilitate a 
commercial resolution negotiated by the parties. 
 The FCC has identified an increasing number of instances 
where disputes arise and the parties cannot reach a timely 
settlement. Technological innovations make it more possible for 
stakeholders to single out traffic streams and demand additional 
compensation backed up by the ability to prevent such traffic from 
reaching intended recipients. The Commission appreciates that 
various parties also may secure greater negotiating leverage simply 
by stalling. For example, it sees a public interest benefit in 
preventing Local Franchise Authorities from delaying the grant of 
authorization for new video service competitors to enter the 
marketplace.106 The Commission also sees a benefit in becoming 
more active in monitoring retransmission consent negotiations, 
particularly ones that have so stalled as to trigger the temporary 
elimination of consumer access to desirable video content.107 
                                                
106 In re Implementation of Section 621(A)(1) of the Cable Communications 
Policy Act of 1984 as Amended by the Cable Television Consumer Protection 
and Competition Act of 1992, 22 F.C.C.R. 5101 (2007), cert. denied sub nom. 
Alliance for Community Media v. FCC, 129 S. Ct. 2821 (2009). 
107 Amendment of the Commission’s Rules Related to Retransmission Consent, 
MB Docket No. 10-71, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, FCC 11-31, 2011 WL 
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 Level 3 wants the Commission to intervene in an Internet 
traffic carriage dispute triggered by a significant increase in traffic 
that has resulted in an imbalance. Had Fox persisted in blocking 
Cablevision broadband customers’ access to content, the 
Commission surely would have received plenty of consumer 
complaints. The Commission must consider whether and how to 
act on such complaints. It should err on the side of not intervening 
unless and until the dispute results in elimination of reduction of 
opportunities for end users to access lawful content when such 
access is throttled, restrained, blocked and otherwise handicapped 
for no legitimate reason. 
 The FCC has lawful authority to investigate possibly 
anticompetitive and discriminatory conduct as well as suspicious 
conduct deliberately obscured by non-disclosure agreements and 
the lack of transparency and candor in dealings with the 
Commission. However, the FCC should appreciate that it risks 
unlawfully or unnecessarily meddling with commercial, 
marketplace-driven negotiations best left to the individual 
stakeholders. The time to intervene may occur when the parties 
care so much about extracting concessions from each other that 
they ignore the harm they cause consumers.  
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